International Aspects of Banking Regulations - Panama and U.S. by Molina, Annette Cecilia De Leon
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
LLM Theses and Essays Student Works and Organizations
1-1-1998
International Aspects of Banking Regulations -
Panama and U.S.
Annette Cecilia De Leon Molina
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works and Organizations at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in LLM Theses and Essays by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have
benefited from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Molina, Annette Cecilia De Leon, "International Aspects of Banking Regulations - Panama and U.S." (1998). LLM Theses and Essays.
213.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/213
. . . ,,
v ,,
.
! !"•'
I','! '. ' ...
.''.:.' ; •'•,'
•;<•!
,
.'
..
.* '
.
.
...•:..'
.
..
::v :
."
:
:"
'.:'
.. .
' v . ,v ;,; .
.'.' '.
.
.
.
'
,...'•'....
i
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF BANKING REGULATIONS
PANAMA AND U.S.
Annette Cecilia De Leon Molina
KifcAoolof%aur
97i& 9/nwersity of&evryias
The University of Georg
ymmm^JRJSSm^S^\ Alexander Campbell King Law Libn
3 8425 00347 4751
.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2013
http://archive.org/details/internationalaspOOIeon
IN .RNATIONAL ASPECTS OF BANKING REGULATIONS
PANAMA AND U.S.
by
ANNETTE CECILIA DE LEON MOLINA
Licenciada. Universidad Santa Maria La Antigua. Panama. 1996
A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty
of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment
of the
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF LAW
ATHENS, GEORGIA
1998
UNIVERS
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF BANKING REGULATIONS
PANAMA AND U.S.
by
ANNETTE CECILIA DE LEON MOLINA
Annroved:
ApprovedAp d: *-v
Dean of the Graduate School
Date J
PrnfV*<:«f»r »Major Professor
Date u r ~x
Reading Chair
j
-lite
Date r-^
^g-
DEDICATION
A Dios Nuestro Senor y a Nuestra Senora de los Angeles, por ser mi luz y fortaleza.
A mis padres y hermanos. por ser mis mejores amigos.
A Rolando, por su amor y apoyo incondicional.
Los ama.
Ceci.
in
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DEDICATION iii
CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION 1
2 IMPORTANCE OF BANKING REGULATIONS 4
What is a Bank and Banking Business? 8
Classification and Attributions of Banks 12
3 THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST WITH THE
BANKING SYSTEM OF PANAMA 14
Historical Facts 15
Innovations Regarding the Dual Banking System 18
Justifications and Critics of the Dual Banking System 24
Regulatory Agencies 28
4 BASIC REGULATORY ASPECTS 42
Safety and Soundness of the Banking System 43
Regulation of Foreign Banks 69
5 CONCLUSIONS 93
i\
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The integration of world markets and the penetration
by foreign banks of domestic banking markets are some of
the results of the banking industry globalization. 1
Globalization has produced a significant increase in the
number of foreign banks operating in the United states.
Foreign banking in the United States is an important
part of the complete scheme of U.S. banking regulation.
As Professors Macey and Miller observe people assume that
foreign banking operations are just a "marginal niche" in
the banking market but the reality is that foreign banks
are a very big business in the U.S." and world wide.
Regulation of foreign bank entry into a country'
s
banking system, and its supervision differ from country to
Patricia Skigen, Seventh Annual Financial Services
Institute, Globalization of banking: Foreign banking in
the United States, 639 PLI/Corp 273, 27 9 ( 198 9 )[ hereinafter
Skiegen] . International banking "has become much more
important for larger U.S. banks in the last generation,
and bigtime international banks have spread globally in
their network of deposit, loan financing and currency
exchange activities." See William Lovett, Banking and
Financial Institutions, 206 ( 1997 ) [hereinafter Lovett].
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller, Banking Law and
Regulation, 2ed., 683 ( 1997 ) [hereinafter Macey and Miller].
2country. These difference are related to internal
policies and ways each country wants to address its
banking industry and economy. 3
This thesis deals with the new banking reality that
the Republic of Panama is confronting with its observance
to the Basle Accord Guidelines . At the beginning of
1997, a group of banking experts started to talk about the
modernization of the Panamanian banking law. Now the new
law is a reality and its main change is the adoption of
the Basle Accord Capital Standards as part of its new
banking regulations.
The intention of this work is to study the dynamics
of the Basle Accord and U.S. regulation of banks and to
contrast them with Panama's new legislation, with the
intention of identify how Panama's international banking
relationship and services may be improved.
The second chapter presents an overview of important
banking regulations and basic banking concepts as well as
basic classes and attributions of banks.
The third chapter examines the dual banking system
and compares it with Panama's banking system. U.S. banks
fall into one of two categories of chartering: federal or
Elana Scoler, Foreign bank entry into the United States,
Canada & Mexico: How NAFTA alters the banking laws, 9-SPG
Int'l Practicum 44 ( 1996) [hereinafter Scoler].
state, while Panama does not have a dual system. The dual
system is a very important consideration when foreign
banks are planning to start a banking business in the U.S.
since a bank's jurisdictional charter determines the
system of laws and agencies that are going to govern its
operations
.
i
Chapter Four examines the basic features of
international banking regulation with special attention
being given to the capital adequacy standards established
by the Basle Accord and the U.S. regulations of foreign
banks currently engaged or seeking establish banking
operations in the United States. This chapter describes
the recently signed Basle Accord and its implementing
regulations in the U.S. as well as the BCCI case that
opened regulators eyes to the gaps that still exist in
international banking regulations. 5
Thomas Shelton and James Colter Harris, Banking
Regulation, US/1, November 1995 [hereinafter Shelton].
"The BCCI failure is of great concern because of its
worlwide impact. Multinational banks such as BCCI
transcended national boundaries to link together the
economies of various countries. As a result, a
multinational bank, and particularly its solvency, affects
many countries... The lessons learned from BCCI may prevent
future bank failures that may have an even grater
financial impact worldwide." See Donna Edwards, Note, The
bank of Credit and Commerce International Scandal: A
warning for bank regulators, 24 Law & Pol'Int'l Bus.
1267 (1993) [hereinafter Edwards] .
CHAPTER II
IMPORTANCE OF BANKING REGULATIONS
The international banking business has faced
tremendous opportunity and challenge, and is currently in
a stage of continuing development and expansion. Some of
the changes that the banking industry has experienced are:
rapid advances in communications and computer technology ;
a substantial rise in the interest rates paid on deposits;
a significant liberalization of state laws in relation to
bank holding company interstate acquisition of banks; and
; Michael Maloy, U.S. International Banking Policy:
Prospects and Problems in a New Millennium, 15 Ann. Rev.
Banking L. 277, ( 1996)
.
[hereinafter Maloy
]
"Financial modernization is a nice way of saying that
banking is about to go through a period of change that
will make what has happened in the past look like a slow
crawl." Arnold G. Danielson, How will financial
modernization impact banking in the South, 16 NO. 16
Banking Pol'y Rep. 5 ( 1997 ) [hereinafter Danielson].
One of the factors that contributes to the globalization
of the banking business is the technological advances in
communications and information exchange. Globalization
has produced a significant increase in the number of U.S.
offices of foreign banks and their share of the U.S. loan
market. The increased activities of foreign banks in the
U.S. have produced stronger competition for business and
market share. See Skigen, supra note 1 at 280.
an increase in competition from foreign banks.' It is the
objective of bank regulations to avoid monopolies for
existing banks and to increase competition." 1 Because
maintenance of competition is essential for public
confidence, government regulation is an important element
in the banking area. An unregulated banking market would
be an easy target of no confidence from the public and
would stimulate bank failures. 11
Every country' s legislation is trying to control and
regulate their banking activity in order that depositors
and stockholders may be protected.' Thus, the banking
business is subject to strict regulation and supervision
with corrective authority for dangerous practices.
Another important concern of the regulatory
authorities is banks' capital adequacy and the enforcement
of reserve requirements. 1 In the United States and
Panama the two major components of banking regulation are
Arthur Wilmarth, The expansion of state bank powers, the
federal response, and the case for preserving the dual
banking system, 58 Fordtham L. Rev. 1133, 1139
(1990) [hereinafter Wilmarth]
.
9 Corpus Juris Secundum, Bank and Banking § 2, (1996)
.
11 Id. at 306.
"[BJanking activity remained based in industrial
national systems, governed by national law." Maloy, supra
note 6 at 279. "Protection of depositors of a Bank and
the investors in shares of bank stock is a proper subject
for statutory regulation." Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson,
439 F. Supp. 252 (D.R.I. 1977). See also 1 Bank and
Banking §3 (1986) .
Lovett, supra note 1 at 117.
the regulation of banks and the regulation of bank holding
companies . 14
The regulation of banks includes provisions for
federal deposit insurance, entry requirements, activities
restrictions, minimum capital standards, geographic
restrictions on the location of branches, and lending
limits.' The bank holding company regulations include
activity restrictions for the nonbank subsidiaries of bank
holding companies, limitation in geographic expansion,
capital adequacy and other requirements. 16
The United States structure of banking regulation has
its intellectual origins in the bank failures of the Great
Depression." The regulatory response to this situation
was the enactment by Congress of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act of 1933.
New regulatory policies were created to avoid bank
failures and fraud, like "entry control, price control,
Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew Rosenfield and Robert
Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding
companies, 73 Va . L. Rev. 301 , 302 ( 1 987
)
[hereinafter
Rosenfield and Stillman]
.
15 Id. at 301.
10 Id. at 302.
During the Depression it was assume that bank failures
had been caused by ^excessive competition' during the boom
years of the 1920' s. Bank failures were contagious
because the failure of one bank could undermine the public
confidence in other banks, causing them to fail as well.
Id.
7market allocation through the forced separation of
commercial banking from investment banking and securities
activities, and close supervision of investment and
related activities.""
In Panama, the regulation of the banking business had
its origins in the enactment of the Cabinet Decree 238 of
July 2, 1970. This law created the Panama International
Banking Center 1 ", which embraced at that time one hundred
and fifty (150) banks, an asset total of fifty million
dollars, more job offers and a service culture." 1 The
success of the Panama Banking Center has stimulate the
birth of other banking centers in neighboring countries
that now compete with the services offer by Panama."
Because of this new panorama, the Panama Banking
Association is working together on a bill with the
Panamanian Government in the amendment of the 1970' s law."'
Government protection against market competition through
the entry and price control that would make banks and
other
firms more safe and sound was the "medication" to these
"illness". Id. at 303.
The achievements reached by the Panama International
Banking Center are the increment of the banking services
in private transactions; the opening of the local
investment market to the international exchange market;
the establishment of a national exchange market and the
development of a growing Banking System. Panama Banking
Association, Centro Financiero, Aho 15 No. 82- Julio/
Agosto, 5 ( 1997 ). [hereinafter Centro Financiero]
20 Id. at 1.
21 Id. at 5.
22 Id.
The new bill is going to have new regulatory elements that
deal with foreign intermediaries and financial instruments
in an effort to attract new sources capital for the direct
investments needed by Panama's economy.
^
J
As a result of global economic integration in the
last two decades involving extensively banking systems
operating abroad, national regulatory entities must have
expanded capacity to supervise banks with operations
beyond their home countries. 2 ' The Basle Accord seeks such
joint supervision between both the home country and host
country regulatory entities looking for what is called
"total supervision"." 5
A. What is a Bank and Banking Business?
The term "bank" has been defined in many different
terms, but they tend to embrace the same fundamental
ideas."' A bank is a "moneyed institution, generally
incorporated and of quasi-public character, whose business
it is to receive money on deposit, cash checks or drafts,
discount commercial paper, and make loans.""
Generally, bank "implies a place for the deposit of
money and that is the most obvious purpose and a primary
23 Id.
24 Id. at 6.
25 Id. at 6.
9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 2, (1996)
27
Id.
function of such an institution
.
" 2: The FDIC Act E defines
a bank as "any National Bank, State Bank, and any former
Savings Association that has converted from a Savings
Association charter and is a Savings Association Insurance
Fund Member." 30
Another definition for bank is as follow:
"the place of business where credits are opened
by the deposits or collection of money or
currency, subject to be paid or to be remitted
upon draft, check, or order; or where money is
advanced on loaned or received for discount or
for sale." 31
Panamanian Cabinet Decree Number 238 set forth the
meaning of bank as "every juridical person engaged in the
banking business, other than the Savings and Loans
Associations authorized according to the laws."'"
Banks are institutions that provide financial
services. The liquidity services provided to depositors
are some of the services that a banking institution offers
to their customers. Banks also provide some services
through their lending activities. These institutions
See 10 Am Jur 2d, § 1 (1997
29 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act of 1933.
30 See 10 Am Jur 2d, § 1 (1997).
31 Tax Comm'n v. Yavapai Country Sav. Bank, 52 Ariz 374, 81
P2d 86. See also 10 Am Jur 2d., § 1 (1997).
32 Cabinet Decree Number 238 of July 2, 1970. Whereby the
Banking System is amended and the National Banking
Commission is established.
10
assess credit risk and fund and monitor investment
projects
.
J
The concept of a bank as a financial intermediary that
offers transaction services refers to the two sides of a
bank's balance sheet." The balance sheet for banking
institutions is divided into assets and liabilities in
which demand deposits dominate the liability side of the
balance sheet of most banks. 3
The liabilities side of a bank' s balance sheet
consists of demand deposits, which includes checking
accounts, saving accounts (active turn- over and passive
turn-over); time deposits, which consist in repurchase
agreement accounts, short-term deposit accounts and medium-
term deposit accounts; debts, to government, Central Bank,
or other financial support for borrowing, to other banks
for borrowing; capital, which includes shareholders
equity, surplus and reserve for contingent liabilities; and
capital loans, that are special loans to provide bridge
Rosenfield and Stillman, supra note 14 at 306.
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 61.
Banks are distinct from other types of financial
intermediaries in that a high percentage of their
liabilities are liquid, while a high percentage of their
assets, long term commercial loans, are illiquid. No other
entity combines liquid liabilities with illiquid assets in
the same manner as banks. Id. at 306-07.
LI
financing in anticipation of subsequent sale of additional
shareholder stock to increase capital resources. 3
The assets side consist of reserves, which includes
cash; accounts in reserve banks; other reserve assets
(e.g., Federal bills, notes or bonds, State bills, bonds or
notes, Municipal notes or bonds, and bank accounts earning
interest); liquid assets, which consist of government
securities and corporate securities; physical assets and
miscellaneous, which includes buildings, equipment,
supplies, leases, etc.; and loans, which consist of loan
obligations readily marketable and not readily marketable."'
As a financial intermediary, the asset side of a bank
focuses on obligations rather than activities that are
directly productive in their own right. 31
A simply model of a bank balance sheet 3 " is:
Assets Liability/Net
Cash Deposits
Fixed Rate Mortgages Equity
Lovett, supra note 1 at 139.
37 Id.
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 61.
The bank does not engage directly in productive activity
but rather provide funds to other enterprises. It is
capitalized principally through demand deposits. Id.
The business of U.S. banking, in essence, consists of
the following functions:
"the issue of notes payable or demand, intended
to circulate as money where the banks are banks
of issue; in receiving deposits payable on
demand; in discounting commercial paper; making
loans of money or collateral security; buying and
selling bills of exchange; negotiating loans; and
dealing in negotiable securities issued by the
government, state and national, and municipal and
other corporations; or the exercise of any
banking function." 4 "
In comparison, the banking business under the
Panamanian banking law is:
"Primarily the act of obtaining financial
resources from the public through the acceptance
of demand or time deposits of money or through
any other means authorized by the pertinent law;
and the use, an account and the risk of the bank,
of such resources for loans, investments, or any
other transaction authorized by law or banking
practices."
B. Classification and Attributions of Banks.
Banks are classified as (1) banks of' deposits; which
include savings banks and all others that receive money on
deposit; and (2) banks of discount, those which loan money
on collateral or by means of discounts of commercial
40 State v. Currency Services, 358 Mo. 983, 218 S. W. 2d
600. See also 10 Am Jur §2. Any person engaged in the
business carried on by banks of deposits, or of discount,
or of circulation, is doing a banking business, although
but one of those functions is exercised. MacLaren v. State,
141 Wis. 577, 124 N.W. 667; see also People v. Bartrow
(N.Y.), 6 Cow. 290. See 1 Banks and Banking, §2 1986.
41 Cabinet Decree Number 238 of July 2, 1970.
13
paper."' Banks are also classified as savings banks,
commercial banks and trust companies."'
The principal attributions of a bank are to receive
deposits'* 4 , to issue negotiable notes and to discount notes.
Although it is not necessary to exercise all of these
attributes; generally, banks exercise more than one of
these functions. 4 If a corporation has been granted the
power to do some of these bank attributes, that does not
make it a bank. 46
Banks may be banks of deposits or banks of discount, the
same bank generally performs both of these operations. 9
C.J.S. Bank and Banking, § 3, (1996)
Id. A trust company is a bank, however, trust companies
are distinguished from, and are not regarded as, banks
within the commonly accepted concept of the term. See
First Nat. Trust & Sav. Bank of San Diego v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 2 P. 2d 347, 213 C. 322, 78 A.L.R.
1324.
A distinctive feature of the business of banking is the
receiving of the money of other on deposit. In the early
years of the banking business, it consisted only of
receiving deposits for safe-keeping. Even today, a bank is
primarily a place for the deposit of money. 9 C.J.S. Bank
and Banking, § 4 (1996) .
A banking institution exercising any one or more of these
functions is a bank in the strictest commercial sense.
Actually, banks are prohibited from issuing circulating
notes. Id.
46 Id.
CHAPTER III
THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT CONTRAST WITH THE
BANKING SYSTEM OF PANAMA
One of the biggest differences between the Panama and
U.S. banking system is that the United States has a dual
banking system and Panama has an unitary banking system.
The dual banking system allows a bank to be chartered and
supervised by either federal or state authorities. 4
As Geoffrey Miller has observed "the dual banking
system has long been a sacred cow in the American political
tradition
.
" 4i However, this system is suffering the
consequences of the rapid evolution of the nation's
financial system. All the changes that are happening in
Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Banking Law Symposium, Recent
Challenges to the persistent dual banking system, 41 St.
Louis U.L.J. 263, 264 ( 1996 ). [hereinafter Schooner]
Geoffrey Miller, The future of the dual banking system,
53 Book L. Rev. 1, 2(1987). [hereinafter Miller]
14
15
the banking industry are going to be reflected in the dual
banking system. 4 "
A. Historical Facts.
Since the U.S.'s early years, the federal and state
governments have shared responsibility for the regulation
of banking. 5 Between 1787 and 1836, the state governments
chartered and regulated many banks while the federal
government chartered and regulated only two banks. 2 After
1836, state legislatures enacted 'free banking laws' that
were general incorporation laws that permitted any person
to obtain a bank charter upon some conditions."' Between
1836-1863 the unique chartering authority for banking
49 Id.
Schooner, supra note 47 at 264.
The two banks chartered and regulated by the federal
government were the first Bank of the United States (1791-
1811) and the Second Bank of the United States (1816-1936)
.
See Wilmarth supra note 9 at 1153. "The approval of the
charter of the first bank of the U.S. was obtained by
Alexander Hamilton over the opposition of Thomas Jefferson
and James Madison. In rechartering the Second Bank of the
U.S., President Jackson declared that the bank was
subversive of the rights of the States, and dangerous to
the liberties of the citizens because it made possible a
concentration of power in the hands of a few men
irresponsible to the people" See Id. at 1256 FN 79.
The 'free banking' laws facilitated the chartering of new
banks and assured the development of a decentralized
banking industry. Id. at 1153.
16
institutions were the states. 3 In many states "access to
bank charters became more automatic or freely available,
provided that moderate initial capital requirements were
satisfied by the incorporators."' Each state had their own
policies but the regulator's basic standards were strict
supervision, capital requirements, and "enforcing specie
convertibility." 3 " State banks were the subject to failures
because of the laxity in the performance of these
standards. Many state banks suffered frequent runs, and
this prompted a lose of public confidence. 56
The dual banking system was born by ^accident'
.
During the Civil War 57 , Congress passed the National Bank
Act of 1863. 3t The intention was not to create a dual
banking system, but to enact stronger federal banking
legislation. 5 The Act's intention was to "provide for a
Lovett, supra note 1 at 11
54
Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
During the Civil War, eleven southern and agrarian states
were out of the Congress. Id. at 12.
"Congress decided to reinstitute a system of national
banks in 1863, choosing the state free banking model
instead of the centralized federal approach of the First
and Second Banks of the United States." See Wilmarth,
supra note 9 at 1153.
59 Id.
17
uniform national currency and to help finance the Civil
War." 60
The intention of the Act was not achieved and in 1865
Congress increased federal taxes on state bank notes.
State banks avoided the tax on bank notes by using checking
accounts as a substitute. Thus, instead of converting
from state to federal charters, the existing state banks
remained, making the dual banking system a reality. € '
During the last sixty years, Congress has acted in a
manner that has preserved a central role for the states in
bank regulation. In the 1930' s, Congress rejected
proposals that would have eliminated the state banking
system. Instead "Congress allowed national banks to
establish branches only within their home state and only to
the degree expressly permitted by state law and made
federal deposit insurance available to all state banks."
In the 1950' s, interstate acquisitions of banks by bank
Schooner, supra note 47 at 265. "The National Banking
Act of 1863 encouraged federal chartering of states banks
with modest capitalization requirement, but imposed
stronger reserve requirements and limitations on the note
issue of federally chartered banks". See Lovett, supra
note 1 at 12
.
Kenneth Scott, The dual banking system: A model of
competition in regulation, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 9(1977)
[hereinafter Scott]. Congress attempted, in 1865, to drive
state banks out of business by placing a prohibitive ten
percent tax on their circulating notes. See Wilmarth,
supra note 9 at 1153-54.
62 See Wilmarth, supra note 9 at 1153-54.
63 Id. at 1154.
16
holding companies without state authorization was not
allow. c ' In 1933 and 1956, it was determined by Congress
that "state control over bank expansion would preserve a
decentralized banking industry and prevent the growth of
concentrated financial power.""
B. Innovations regarding the Dual Banking System.
Since the Civil War, the banking industry has operated
under a system of state and federal regulation. Banks can
determine the nature of the regulations to which they will
be subject as well as the government agency that exercise
that regulatory function, by selecting one chartering
authority rather than another. °'
Under the dual banking system it is impossible to
evolve to a regulatory monopoly of one banking agency that
would enable the creation and enforcement of a "single
The prohibition by Congress of the interstate acquisition
of banks by bank holding companies had the intention of
preserve state control over the expansion of banking
organizations. Id.
Id. "In adopting and amending the McFadden Act in 1927
and 1933, and in passing the Duglas Amendment in 1956,
congressional supporters of state control over bank
branching and interstate bank acquisitions repeatedly
referred to the need for a decentralized banking system."
See Id. At 1256 FN 86; see also Clarke v. Securities Indus.
Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 413 (1987).
1 Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 112. See also Miller,
supra note 48 at 1.
19
industrial cartel" which implies "banking operated in the
environment of a government-sponsored and enforced
cartel." 08 Fixing the prices that depository institutions
can pay for deposits, and dividing markets are the
principal elements of cartel banking. Under Cartel
banking, the banking structure is presumed was stable, and
when combined with the federal deposit insurance, banking
failures are likely to be a rare event. However, the
resulting banking structure and its regulations are
unlikely to be innovative. In contrast, the dual banking
system has produced a continuing series of innovations in
bank regulation at both state and federal levels, and
together with federal deposit insurance, made bank failures
a rare event . '
The dual banking system allows states to act as
^laboratories for change' originating "free banking laws,
checking accounts, branch banking, real estate lending,
trust services, reserve requirements, and deposit
See Kenneth Scott, supra note 61 at 3; see also Wilmarth,
supra note 9 at 1155. The phrase refers to the fact that
"banking operated in the environment of a government-
sponsored and enforced cartel." See Miller, supra note 48
at 2.
68 Miller, note 48 at 2.
"The division of markets works between depository and
nondepository institutions, and among depository
institutions according to their loan portfolios and
geographic location." Id. at 4.
70
Id.
::
insurance" . ~ All these innovations were later
incorporated by Congress into the laws governing federal
banks
.
The banking structure is increasingly becoming more
competitive. State banking has embraced the creation of
interstate electronic funds transfer (EFT) systems through
the establishment of networks of automated teller machines
(ATM's) 72 ; the initiation of the negotiable order of
withdrawal (NOW) account concept, which are "savings
accounts which allow the customer to withdraw funds by
means of a negotiable instrument"' 3 ; and interstate
acquisition of healthy banks by bank holding companies.'
In the latter, Congress was "unable to adopt legislation
due to a stalemate among competing segments of the banking
industry"'' As a result, state laws have embraced
interstate acquisition instead of being preempted law. 7
71 Wilmarth, supra note 9 at 1156.
72 Id. at 1156.
See S.Rep. No. 368, 96 th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6, reprinted in
1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 236. See also Wilmarth,
supra note 9 at 1256 FN 99. "Congress gave nationwide
authorization for NOW accounts service only after several
states had demonstrated that NOW accounts are highly
desirable to both consumers and banks." Twenty years ago,
several states authorized state-chartered savings banks to
offer NOW accounts. It was so successful that Congress
gave nationwide authorization for the offering of this
service by all federally-insured depository institutions.
See S. Rep. No. 368 at 5.
Wilmarth, supra note 9 at 1156.
75 Id. at 1157.
76
Id.
Z X
On the other hand, regulatory innovation has not been
absent on the national-chartered side of the dual banking
system. In the 1960's, the Comptroller of the Currency
liberalized chartering policies and lending powers for
national banks with the intention of increasing the
attractiveness of national bank franchises. He issued
rules authorizing the establishment and operation of
collective investment funds, the underwriting of revenue
bonds, the operation of insurance and travel agencies and
some other banking services. These rules were reversed by
the courts, but it prompted an increase in the conversions
of state-chartered banks to national chartered banks as
well as other innovations by the states and other federal
agencies
.
Id. See also W. Brown, The dual banking system in the
United States 33-38, 59-66 (1968) [hereinafter Brown]
.
78 Wilmarth, supra note 9 at 1157.
Id. "Saxon's rulings were ultimately reversed by court
decisions, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. V. Camp, 401 U.S. 617
(1981) (striking down regulation authorizing national banks
to establish and operate collective investment funds);
Arnold Tours, Inc. V. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1 st Cir
1972) (invalidating ruling permitting national banks to
operate travel agencies); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Indep.
Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5 th Cir. 1968 )( striking
down interpretative ruling allowing national banks to
operate insurance agencies in towns with a population of
more than 5,000); Port of New York Authority v. Baker,
Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968 )( invalidating
regulation authorizing national banks to underwrite revenue
bonds) ." See Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 123.
22
Another federal innovation has been the expansion of
the branching powers of federal banks. The Comptroller of
the Currency held that "national banks should be given the
same branching powers as state-chartered thrift
institutions based on a finding that such thrifts are
'State Banks' for purpose of the McFadden Act." 80
Looking at the safety and soundness of banks, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 (FIDICIA) made significant changes affecting the dual
banking system. 81 FIDICIA amended the FDIC Act "to limit,
with certain exceptions, the activities and equity
investments of state chartered banks to those permissible
to national banks." 8. The Riegel-Neal Interstate Banking
and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA) held that
"[bank holding companies] could not acquire a bank outside
their home state (state in which they took the most
deposits) unless the state in which the target bank was
located permitted the acquisition." 83
12 U.S.C. § 36 (1988); see Wilmarth, supra note 9 at
1159.
See Schooner, supra note 47 at 268.
82 Id.
"Many of the states (host states) have opted-in on a
reciprocal basis-only allowing banks to branch in that are
located in states which permit banks from the host state to
branch in." See Hal Scott and Phillip Wellons,
International Finance, 4ed ., 140 (1997
)
[hereinafter Int'l
Finance]
.
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Another distinctive feature of the dual banking system
is the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) which
"encourage [s ] institutions to help meet the credit needs of
the local communities in which they are chartered
consistent with the safe and sound operation of such
institutions." 8 ' This Community Reinvestment Act is
considered by banking regulators whenever a banking
institution applies for permission to open a new branch or
make an acquisition. 8
The importance of state authority in issues of
community reinvestment has also been recognized by
Congress. In relation with interstate branching the IBBEA
provides that:
"The laws of the host state regarding community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending
and establishment of intrastate branches shall
apply to a branch of a bank chartered by that
state, except- ( i ) when Federal law preempts the
application of such State laws to a national
bank; or (ii) when the Comptroller of the
Currency determines that the application of such
State laws would have a discriminatory effect on
the branch in comparison with the effect the
application of such State laws would have with
respect to branches of a banks chartered by the
host state." 86
84 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (b) (1994
Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 140.
86 Schooner, supra note 47 at 275. See also 12 U.S.C
36(f) (1) (1994) .
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C. Justifications and Critics of the dual banking system.
The dual banking system remains a vital regulatory
concept within the United States despite critical opinions
of seme policy makers and scholars who view the dual
banking system as an unnecessary and inefficient
structure. 8 Moreover, recent changes in the banking
environment appear to weaken justifications for its
continued existence. 88 . It is believed that state bank
depositors are clearly vulnerable to loses from bank
failure while federal bank depositors are not because of
"the existence of the federal deposit insurance." 8
Despite the above concerns, state regulation and
supervision remain central to the U.S. banking system.
One of the justifications for the system is that it
stimulates healthy competition between federal and state
regulators. 91 That results in a safe and sound banking
Schooner, supra note 47 at 264
i8 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 265
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system. 9i It is asserted that such competition allows banks
"to select among differing sets of banking laws and
bureaucratic incentives to tailor regulations in order to
hold onto their system's share of the chartering market."""'
Scholars criticize this justification because the
competitive pressures to bring more banks into a federal or
state charter will prompt bank regulators to focus on more
flexibility with regard to regulation matters with regard
to regulator's matters; muting attention to the safety and
soundness element inside of the banking system.
*
Another justifications for retaining dual regulation
asserts that state regulators are more sensitive to
The justification is based in that "the dual banking
system leads in more efficient regulations because
competition between the state and national regulators
limits the imposition of unnecessarily burdensome
regulations, controls the abuse of discretion by
regulators, and encourages the development of the most
liberal banking powers consistent with the safety and
soundness of the banking system." See Henry Butler and
Jonathan Macey, The Myth of competition in the dual banking
system, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 677 ( 1988 ) [hereinafter Butler
and Macey]
.
Id. at 684.
Schooner, supra note 47 at 265.
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community necessities," encouraging state banks to be more
responsible for the quality and quantity of services they
offer their customers and thus functioning as a laboratory
for the creation of new services and their assimilation
into the banking system. 95
As mentioned before, the most important weakness of
the dual banking system flows from the competition between
state and federal chartered banks. This competition
creates a laxity in banking controls and endangers bank
safety and soundness. However, there are many factors
that suppress such competition. Professors Butler and
Macey established five forces that prevent regulatory
competition in bank's market:
"(1) the federal government's ability to preempt
state regulations; (2) the federal government's
provision of the only viable deposit insurance
through the Federal deposit Insurance
Corporation- this leaves state banks subject to
"State departments are on the ground. They know the
bank, they know the management, they know the local
community and they know the trends that are afoot in the
state's economy." Id. at 266. For a better discussion see
also, James Watt, The dual banking system now more than
ever, Address at the conference of the state Bank
supervisors Annual Meeting and Conference 4 (April 15-18,
1994)
.
"The dual banking system is created with allowing for
state and local innovation in financial services. A former
Superintendent of Banks for New York State wrote: 'It is
here that bankers know the needs of their customers, the
products to offer to attract new business.'" Schooner at
266. See also, Jill Considine, A State's response to the
United States Treasury department proposals to modernize
the nation's banking system, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S244
(1991) [hereinafter Considine]
.
:
_
federal-FDIC regulation; (3) federal legislation,
which, until recently prevented interstate
banking; (4) the doctrine of "competitive
equality", which limits national banks'
activities to the activities permissible for
state banks; and (5) state "wild card statutes,
which impose national bank regulations on state
banks." 96
They consider the supremacy clause to be the primary force
that suppresses competition, because it enables the federal
government to preempt diversity and impose uniformity .
*
See Schooner, supra note 47 at 267. At least five
distinct forces work to prevent the realization of true
regulatory competition in the market for banks charters.
The fist is the ability of the federal government, through
the supremacy clause, to trump state regulation when doing
so serves its interests . Second, as a matter of
competitive necessity, both state and federal banks must
obtain federally provided deposit insurance, and the FDIC
requires that banks obtaining such insurance comply with
its uniform regulations regardless of contrary provisions
in the laws of individual states. The third force is the
McFadden Act, which has prevented free interstate banking
and thereby has allowed the segmentation of the nation into
over fifty geographic markets. The fourth is the
competitive equality doctrine, which requires national
banks so follow state law when establishing branch banks.
This enables state authorities to maintain local cartels
and restricts competition among banks in certain
geographical locations. The fifth force is the laws
passed by a majority of states that automatically impose
the regulations of national banks on state banks--the so-
called 'wild card' statutes. Thus, even in those
situations in which Congress or the FDIC has refrained from
mandating uniform standards, two additional sets of rules--
the competitive equality doctrine and state 'wild card'
statutes— reduce competition among regulators in the
provision of banking laws. See Butler and Macey, supra note
91 at 693-94.
97 Butler and Macey, supra note 91 at 717.
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Also, the dual system is criticized for "creating a
costly system of overlapping regulation""* where state banks
are regulated by both state and federal regulators, causing
unnecessary costs for some banks." Ironically, this
costly regulation also introduces a 'moral hazard' by
virtue of FDIC insurance to state banks. It is believed
that state regulators have less interest in preserving the
safety and soundness of state banks because if the bank
fails the FDIC is in charge and is going to be
responsible
.
10C
D . Regulatory Agencies .
The agencies that regulate the business of banking in
the United States are the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Insurance
Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Office
of Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union
Schooner, supra note 47 at 267.
The overlap is far from being eliminated while federal
and state authorities have made efforts to coordinate
examination and supervision. Id.
The phrase 'moral hazard' is used "to denote a condition
in which the knowledge that a third party will bear the
costs of some harm creates a risk that the actor may fail
to take due precautions against occurrence of the harm.
The deposit insurance system is often said to create moral
hazard on the part of depository institutions by giving
them an incentive to take excessive risks with the
knowledge that the costs of unsuccessful risk-taking will
be borne by the deposit insurance funds, while the benefits
will be captured by the banks." Miller, supra note 48 at
18-19.
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Administration, and the State Banking Departments." l In
Panama, the banking industry is actually regulated by the
National Banking Commission.
1. United States
a . Office of the Comptroller of the Currency .
National Banks are chartered through the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). This office is in
charge of the execution of law related to the issue and
regulation of a national currency secured by U.S. bonds and
of all Federal Reserve notes, with some exceptions. The
chief of this office is the Comptroller of the Currency
(CC) who is under the direction and supervision of the
Secretary of the Treasury. 1 ' The Comptroller of the
Currency is appointed by the President, by and with the
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 66-69.
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has
principal supervisory authority over national banks. It
issues charters for new national banks and supervises the
operations of existing national banks through a corps of
bank examiners. Id. at 67.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1. There shall be in the Department of
the Treasury a bureau charged with the execution of all
laws passed by Congress relating to the issue and
regulation of a national currency secured by United States
bonds and, under the general supervision of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, of all Federal
Reserve notes, except for the cancellation and destruction,
and accounting with respect to such cancellation and
destruction, of Federal Reserve notes for circulation, the
chief officer of which bureau shall be called the
Comptroller of the Currency, and shall perform his duties
under the general directions of the Secretary of the
Treasury
.
30
advice and consent of the Senate, and holds his office for
a term of five years unless sooner removed by the
President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the
Senate. L Actually, the Comptroller has considerable
autonomy from both the President and the Secretary of the
Treasury. 105 The 1994 amendments of the U.S. Code
established that the Secretary of the Treasury is barred
from delaying or preventing the issuance of any rule or the
promulgation of any regulation by the Comptroller. 1 The
Comptroller also has the specific duty to administer the
national banking laws and to supervise national banks. He
also has the power to take possession of the assets of
problem banks and assume control of their operations. For
the accomplishment of this purposes he can appoint a
receiver. 1 ' In chartering a bank, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency states that the proposed bank
must be "operated in safe and sound manner, possess
104 12 U.S.C.A. § 2
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 67.
The Secretary of the Treasury may not delay or prevent
the issuance of any rule or the promulgation of any
regulation by the Comptroller of the Currency. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 1.
The Comptroller of the currency is vested with general
administrative powers and duties even though they may be
judicial in character, for the administration of the
national banking laws, and he is charged with the duty of
supervising national banks, and he has the power to take
possession of the assets of the bank and assume control of
its operations, and for such purposes can appoint a
receiver and place him in complete charge. Id.
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reasonable prospecis for success and meet the credit needs
of the community." 1Ct To achieve these goals, the OCC
considers the following factors when deciding on the
approval of a bank application:
1. the bank's future earnings prospects;
2. the general character of its management;
3. the adequacy of its capital structure;
A . the convenience and needs of the community to
be served by the bank;
5. the financial history and condition of the
bank; and
6. whether or not it has complied with all the
provisions of the National Bank Act and whether
or not its corporate powers are consistent with
the purpose of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act. 109
The evolution of the OCC examination process can be
summarized into three phases: prior to the 1980' s, during
the 1980' s, and the current supervisory approach. 1 Prior
to the 1980' s the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
was required to conduct at least three exams every two
years. The exams were part audit and part review and were
conducted pursuant to general policies and procedures. 1
During the 1980' s the OCC conducted bank examinations with
less frequency and without the use of the audit aspect.
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 91-92.
109 Id. at 92
Robert B. Serino, Supervisory approach of the OCC: bank
fraud, enforcement , and related issues, 640 PLI/Corp
323,326 (1989) [hereinafter Serino].
111 Id. at 326
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The exams were conducted pursuant to specific policies and
procedures using the concept of targeted exams. 11 '"
The CCC examination process primarily focuses on
systematic risk and the prioritization of perceived risks
allowing the use of on-site and off-site analysis."
There are four steps the examiner undertakes in the
"supervision by risk process": (1) the identification of
risk using common definitions; (2) the measurement and
evaluation of risk based on common evaluation factors; (3)
the development of a supervisory strategy based on risk and
the performance of the examinations using this strategy;
and (4) the documentation of the conclusions and the
112 Id.
113 Id. "In the 1990' s, supervision by risk has come into
its own. Risk program incorporates the philosophy of
management-driven examinations and continued reliance on
off-site tools to increase our efficiency and minimize
regulatory burden. It also recognizes that periodic
validations of risk management systems are necessary, as is
drilling down and doing more intense reviews where we see
red flags. While all of this may sound the same, or at
least similar to our current method of supervision,
supervision by risk does make some important changes: it
adds consistent definitions and a structured process for
examiners to use in assessing risks; its provides an
analytical framework for the OCC to use in deciding where
to focus resources-in individual banks as well as the
industry as a whole; it lays the foundation for the
communication between examiners and bankers to be based on
risk management. See OCC outlines details of new
^supervision by risk' program, Examination Policy, 15 NO.
2
Banking Pol'y Rep. 5(1996). [hereinafter Examination Policy]
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communication of findings to management and the board. 114
In addition to these examination of banks, the Comptroller
of the Currency's compliance with these standards and
procedures is assured by his duty to make an annual report
to Congress. 115
b. Federal Reserve System.
Under the Federal Reserve Act, the United States has a
central bank to meet the needs of the U.S. economy and
financial system. The U.S. Federal Reserve System (FRS)is
a decentralized central bank consisting of 12 regional
Federal Reserve banks and their branches that operate under
the supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System in Washington, D.C. 116
The FRS was established in December 1913 by the
Federal Reserve Act, and was designed to "rectify the
conditions underlying the recurrent money panics that had
plagued the country for many years." 1 The act has been
amended several times to further the Federal Reserve
System' s ability to foster a sound financial system and a
healthy economy. 1 The components of the Federal Reserve
System are The Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve
4 Examination Policy, supra note 113 at 6.
115 12 U.S.C.A. § 14.
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve
System, Structure and Functions, 1 (1992) [hereinafter FRS
117 Id.
118 Id.
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Banks, Federal Open Market Committee and Advisory
Committees . 119
The Board of Governors (the Board) is composed of
seven members that are appointed by the President for 14
year terms, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 121 The Board performs regulatory functions that
include overseeing the Reserve Banks' services to
depository institutions as well as bank supervision and,
the establishment of accounting procedures. The Board
also approves each Reserve Bank's budget. 1 1 The Board of
Governors provides reports to Congress, including an annual
report on operations and semi-annual reports on the state
of the economy and the System's objectives for the growth
of money and credit. 1. It also sets reserve requirements
for depository institutions and approves discount rate
9 C.J.S. § 650 (1996)
120
"The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
shall be composed of seven members, to be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate... In selecting the members of the Board, not more
than one of whom shall be selected from any one Federal
Reserve District, the President shall have due regard to a
fair representation of the financial, agricultural,
industrial, and commercial interests, and geographical
division of the country. The members of the Board shall
devote their entire time to the business of the Board and
shall each receive basic compensation at the rate of
$16,000 per annum, payable monthly, together with actual
necessary traveling expenses." 12 U.S.C.A. § 241.
121 FRS, supra note 116 at 3.
122 Id.
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changes proposed by Reserve Bank directors."" Finally, it
is in charge of regulations pertaining to financial safety
and soundness as well as consumer protections."
The Federal Reserve Banks are each separately
incorporated, with a Board of nine directors. Some of
their functions are:
(1) Monitor national and international economic
conditions and provide information on their
Districts that the System needs to formulate
monetary policy; (2) Hold reserve balances for
and serve as lender of last resort to depository
institutions; directors establish the discount
rate charged on such loans, subject to approval
by the Board of Governors; (3) Provide financial
services to depository institutions and the U.S.
Treasury; (4) turn over to the Treasury earnings
in excess of the amount needed to pay expenses
and dividends to member banks, maintain a surplus
equal to its paid-in capital, and pay operating
expenses . 12!
The Federal Reserve System also exercises the role as
the U.S. central bank controlling the money supply through
its Open Market Committee. 1, Finally, the Federal Reserve
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 66. The Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) comprises 12 members-the seven
members of the Board of Governors and five Reserve Bank
presidents, one of whom is the president of the Federal
Reserve Bank of new York; other presidents serve one-year
terms on a rotating basis; all participate in each meeting
They meet in Washington, D.C. eight times a year. The
most important instrument of monetary policy are the
directs open market operations. See. FRB, supra note 116
at 4 .
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System has supervision and examination authority over state
chartered member banks. 1,
c. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a
collateral supervising agency for national banks
.
x
' The
FDIC regulates, insures and supervises all state chartered
banks who are not Federal Reserve System members that are
"seeking FDIC insurance protection for their depositors". 1 ""
The FDIC was created by Congress when it passed the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act in 1933. 13C It is an
independent agency headed by a board of five directors.
Two of them are the Comptroller of the Currency and the
director of the Office of Thrift Supervision serving ex
officio. The others are appointed by the President for six
year terms, subject to the advice and consent of the
Senate. 131
The FDIC s primary responsibility is to insure
deposits of all banks authorized by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Act to receive insurance. 1 The FDIC
is authorized to terminate the insured status of any member
Lovett, supra note 1 at 119.
128 Id.
Id. See also Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 13:
130 12 U.S.C.A § 1811-1835a.
131 Id.
132 Id.
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bank; to initiate 'cease and desist proceedings' against
the banks it insures or regulates; and to suspend or remove
any officer or director of an insured bank. 13 ' One of the
powers not given to the FDIC is the power to close a
bank. 134
In 1989, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery
and Enforcement Act(FIRREA) abolished the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) and gave all its
deposit insurance responsibilities to the FDIC. 1 In 1991,
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
enhanced the FDIC's authority over the resolution of
troubled depository institutions.*
d. The Federal Home Loan Bank System.
The Federal Home Loan Bank System consists of 12
regional Federal Home Loan Banks, member savings and loan
associations, and a five-member Federal Housing Finance
Board. 1 The Federal Housing Finance Board lj is an
Jeffrey Portis, FDIC'S powers after a bank failure, 65
U.Det. L. Rev. 259 ( 1988 ){ hereinafter Portis] See 12
U.S.C.A. § 1818 (1997)
.
Portis, supra note 133 at 259. The power to close a
bank is reserved to the OCC, in the case of s national
bank, and to the appropriate state bank authority, in the
case of a state chartered bank. 12 U.S.C.A § 191 (1997).
"The FSLIC provided federal insurance for most of the
nation's savings and loans and savings banks." Macey and
Miller, supra note 2 at 67-68.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 68.
138 12 U.S.C.A. § 1422a (a) (1) .
independent agency in the executive branch of the
Government." The five members of the Federal Housing
Finance Board are the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development and four citizens appointed by the President
for seven-year terms, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate. 140
The Board of Directors have the power to supervise the
federal home loan banks, which have the function of
placing "long-term funds in the hands of local institutions
in order to [satisfy] the need of home owners for low-cost,
long-term, installment mortgage money and to decrease costs
of mortgage money." 141
e. The Office of Thrift Supervision.
The OTS was established in 1989 under FIRREA as an
office in the Department of the Treasury. 1 The Cffice of
Thrift Supervision is charged with the supervision and
regulation of the savings and loan industry.''
139 12 U.S.C.A. § 1422a (a) (2) .
12 U.S.C.A. § 1422a (b) (1) .
141
9 C.J.S. § 669 (1996) . See also Association of Data
Processing Service organizations, inc. V. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., C.A. Ohio, 568 F.2d 478.
142 12 U.S.C.A. § 1462a(a) .
143 Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 68.
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.
The National Credit Union Administration.
The National Credit Union Administration was created
by Congress' enactment of the Federal Credit Union Act 14 '
with the purpose "to establish a system of credit unions to
facilitate the stabilization of the nation's credit
structure, and to achieve an increased availability of
loans." 14 " The NCUA' s function is to charter and supervise
federal credit unions and to provide federal deposit
insurance for national and qualified state-chartered credit
unions through the National Credit Union Share Insurance
Fund. 146
g. State Regulators.
Responsibility for the regulation, supervision and
examination of the state chartered commercial banks,
savings and loans, savings banks, and credit unions is
vested in the State Banking Department for each state. 147
2 . Panama
.
a. National Banking Commission.
As already mentioned, Panama does not have a dual
banking system. The National Banking Commission is the
144 12 U.S.C.A. § 1751 et seq.
145 10 Am.Jur. 2d § 73 (1997).
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 6i
Lovett, supra note 1 at 119.
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unique banking regulatory agency. 14 ' It was created by the
enactment of the Cabinet Decree No. 238 Of July 2, 1970.
The Cabinet Decree established that no person shall engage
in the banking business in the Republic of Panama without
previously having obtained the proper authorization from
the Commission. 14 ' However, the National Banking
Association is charged with 1) the insurance of the
solidity and efficiency of the Panama banking system, 2)
the promotion of appropriate monetary and credit conditions
in Panama's banking business, and 3) the promotion of
adequate conditions for the development of the banking
industry in Panama.'
In Panama's new banking bill, the National Banking
Commission has complete financial autonomy. The
institutions it regulates can not be part of the regulatory
agency and can not take part in its decision-making process
with regard to regulatory standards that will affect the
The National Banking Commission is created and assigned
to the Ministry of Planning and Economic Policy. Cabinet
Decree 238, art. 3.
U9 See Panama Cabinet Decree 238 of July 2, 1970.
Article 4 - The Commission shall have the following
objectives: a) to insure that the solidity and efficiency
of the banking system is maintained so as to promote
monetary and credit conditions conductive to the stability
and sustained growth of the national economy; b) to
strength and promote the proper conditions for the
development of Panama as an international financial center.
See Panama Cabinet Decree 238 of July 2, 1970.
; l
banking system nor with regard to the approval, suspension
or intervention of the banking institutions 151
151 Centro Financiero, supra note 19 at 9
CHAPTER IV
BASIC REGULATORY ASPECTS
Competition between banks in many of their activities
has mutted by protectionism regulation. 1 After an
institution has been chartered and legally constituted to
do business as a bank, it must face the reality of the
limits of its power and the regulatory patterns that it
must follow. 153 . The three most important the federal
banking agencies in charge of the supervision and
examination of U.S. banks are the Federal Reserve System,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. They along with the
State Banking Department or Commissions are "the major
regulatory agencies for bank market regulation." 1 4
For certain aspects of banking institutions, the
Depository Institutions Deregulation Commission (DIDC) 1
and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council
Lovett, supra note 1 at 117.
Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 123.
54 Lovett, supra note 1 at 119.
The Depository Institutions Deregulation Commission was
created by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980. Id. at 119 et seq.
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(FFIEC) also have some regulatory and supervisory authority
regarding particular banking institutions. 156
In Panama, the regulatory and supervisory authority is
the National Banking Commission, which receives some
assistance from the Banking Association of Panama and the
Executive Body of Panama. Similar to United States
regulatory procedures, the National Banking Commission
requires each applicant for a bank charter to file an
application form. The application must be supported with
the plan of operations of the future bank, a description of
earning prospects, some information management
capabilities, adequate capitalization and soundness, and
their plan to serve the community needs. 15
A. Safety and Soundness of the Banking System.
The banking industry requires special regulation to
maintain its safety and soundness. The banking sector
provides products and services to the community which in
turn, have significant effects in the economy. 151
156 Id.
Id. at 123. See also Agreement No. 4-81 of the National
Banking Commission (1981), modified by Agreement No. 19-89
and 17-89 of the National Banking Commission ( 198 9)
.
158 Malloy, supra note 6 at 281.
4 4
Public confidence is a very important element in the
banking business. 15S It is difficult to keep a balance
between competitiveness and safety and soundness because
competitiveness involves risky operations, and safety and
soundness are major factors that maintain public
confidence. 1 ' For example, if a bank wants to compete in
other markets, it must expand the range of risk they
undertake, but to maintain the public confidence banks must
retain the confidence of the broad retail market that
serves as its basic source of funding. 161
One of the basic criteria for risk analysis and
assessment of minimum requirements for the granting of
banking licenses under the Panama National Banking
Commission is the financial situation, which is divided
into stability, soundness, importance and strength. 1
Under stability and soundness the petitioner bank or its
promoter must not have undergone repeated and severe
financial problems; the bank's history must reflect the
59 Banks "can only operate effectively to the extent that
they retain the credit of the community in which they
operate." Id. at 282.
Kenneth Gordon, Notes and Comments, Risk-Based capital
requirements : the proper approach to safe and sound
banking? , 10 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 491,
512 (1991) [hereinafter Gordon]
.
"If a bank's depositor do not maintain confidence in the
bank, the risk of deposit volatility and bank runs
increase." Id.
162 Agreement No. 4-81, article 1 § 1(a) (1981); Agreement
No. 19-89, article 1 § 1(b), dated December 13 th , 1989.
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gradual and constant achievement of new and better levels
of financial capability. 16 ' Under the importance and
strength criteria, the petitioner bank must have a real
established, well-known and recognized prestige in its area
of origin and development that will be appraised on the
basis of indicators such as, profitability, growth,
performance and equity, assets and deposits risks, as well
as other indicators established by the Commission deemed
adequate and pertinent to such purposes/ 64
Safety and soundness regulation is intended to avoid
bank failures, control risks, and ensure adequate capital.
1. Capital Adequacy:
Adequate capital is an important requirement to
maintain the safety and soundness in the international
competitive banking system. 1 ' In the past, bank capital
"Articulo 1-... A. Estabilidad y Solidez: Desde el inicio
de sus operaciones el banco solicitante o promotor no debe
haber tenido repetidos y graves reveses f inancieros . Por
el contrario, la historia del banco debe reflejar el logro
gradual y constante de nuevos y mejores niveles de
capacidad financiera. Agreement No. 4-81, article 1 §
1(a) (1981) .
64
"Articulo 1-...B. Importancia y Fortaleza: El banco
solicitante debe tener una real y reconocida importancia en
el ambiente en que tiene origen y desarrollo. Esta se
apreciara en funcion de los indicadores de rentabilidad,
crecimiento, eficiencia y riesgo sobre su patrimonio, sus
activos totales y sus depositos totales, u otros
indicadores establecidos por la Comision que resulten
adecuados y pertinentes a tales propositos. Agreement No.
19-89, article 1 § 1(b), dated December 13 th , 1989.
165 Malloy, supra note 6 at 283.
46
was used as a "regulatory tool" 1 ' ' but now is being viewed
as the main response to the bank failures of the 1980' s. 1 '
Capital is considered a "financial cushion" that can
contain an institution's losses.'' Bank capital serves as
a source of funds for the acquisition of physical assets.'""
Banks must maintain a specific capital reserve in
relation to the risk level of its activities. In the U.S.
the three primary federal banking regulators have agreed on
166 Gordon, supra note 160 at 491.
See Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards : A legitimate
regulatory concern for prudential supervision on banking
activities, 49 Ohio, St. L.J. 1299 (1989) [hereinafter
Norton]
Permanence, subordination and the ability to absorb
losses are the must important characteristics of capital.
Gordon, supra note 160 at 492.
U.S. Comptroller of the Currency stated that Bank
capital "allows a bank to gain competitive entry by
acquiring the necessary infrastructure to operate. It
provides a cushion to withstand abnormal losses not covered
by current earnings, enabling the bank to regain
equilibrium and re-establish a normal earnings pattern."
Bank capital maintain "the confidence of public lenders in
the bank' s ability to meet maturing demands in most market
conditions, to sustain present and contemplated growth
patterns and to conform to industry standards." See E.
Gardner, Capital Adequacy and Banking Supervision 7 (Bangor
Occasional Papers in Economics No. 19, 1981) [hereinafter
Gardner] ; see also Duncan Alford, Basle Committee
International Capital Adequacy Standards : Analysis and
implications for the banking industry, 10 Dick. J. Int'l L.
189, 191 (1992) [hereinafter Alford]
.
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a "risk-based capital adequacy system". 170 It is a
requirement for the banking institutions to maintain a
minimum capital standard. Federal insured depository
institutions must comply with two capital standards set by
regulators
:
a) leverage limit, which measures an institution's
capital as a percentage of its total assets not
adjusted for risk; and
b) a risk-based capital requirement, which
measures the institution' s capital as a
percentage of its risk-weighted assets. 171
If an institution falls below the minimum capital
standards, it is the responsibility of federal banking
agencies and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to
take corrective actions. 1 ' But if the institution falls
below the "critical capital level", regulators must control
the situation or seize and close the institution by
appointing a conservator in the first case and a receiver
in the second case. 173
"Recent changes in the federal banking laws explicitly
authorize, and in some cases require, the federal banking
agencies to intervene promptly in the operations of a bank
that is inadequately capitalized." See Isaac Lustgarten,
New capital adequacy requirements for banks 9/16/92 W.L.
2507688 R.B.F.S. (1992) [hereinafter Lustgasten]
.
171 Id.
172 12 U.S.C. § 1831 (n) (1994) . Some of the corrective
actions are changes in management, removal of officers and
directors, restrictions on growth, suspension of dividends,
and/or a plan to increase capital. See Lovett, supra note 1
at 131.
The appointment of a receivership happens in cases when
the bank stays below the "critical capital level" for more
than a year. Lovett, supra note 1 at 131.
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a. Background.
From the early twentieth century until World War II
bank regulators measured capital adequacy with a capital-to
deposits ratio. The adequate capital ratio was 10%. '
After the war, U.S. regulators (FDIC and FRS ) employed a
capital-to-totai-asset ratio. This capital-to-total-assets
measure failed because it was an "unsophisticated measure
of a bank's financial position; the relative riskiness of a
bank' s activities was not considered in determining the
appropriate capital position of an institution." 1 "
In the late 1940' s, the office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) attempted to adjust the measurement for
risk using a capital to risk-adjusted assets measure. 17 '
Risk-adjusted assets were calculated by subtracting cash,
bank balances and U.S. government securities from total
assets. 1 '' In 1952, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
calculated minimum bank capital by breaking down risky
174 Alford, supra note 169 at 194. "The capital-to-deposit
ratio was used until World War II when bank deposits
expanded rapidly as a result of bank purchases of
government securities issue to finance the war effort."
See also Gordon, supra note 160 an 493.
An example of why this measure is consider
unsophisticated would be that "two banks with an equal
amount of assets had to maintain equal capital, even though
one of the banks had eighty percent of its assets in cash
and the second bank had its assets in risky commercial
loans." Gordon, supra note 160 at 494.
176 Alford, supra note 169 at 194.
Id. Cash, bank balances and U.S. government securities
carried no risk of loss.
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assets into six risk weight categories. 1 ' It assigned a
"capital requirement percentage to each category and the
assets in each group were then multiplied by the risk
percentage" 17 " 1 having as a result the amount of capital a
bank was required to maintain.
The ABC formula 180 was developed by the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, in 1956, but it was abandoned because
it demanded excessive capital. 181 In the late 1960's and
early 1970' s, the OCC regulators moved away from using
capital adequacy ratios and decided to consider selected
factors on a case-by-case analysis. They concluded that
the capital adequacy focus did not incorporate all the
factors determinative of the soundness of a financial
institution were not consider and therefore it was not
accurate enough. 182
Management quality, assets liquidity, history of
earnings and its retention thereof, quality and character
of ownership, deposit volatility, quality of operating
178 Id.
179 Gordon, supra note 160 at 494.
"The ABC formula combined a capital adequacy test and a
liquidity test in determining the required level of
capital." See Alford, supra note 169 at 222.
181 Banks were required to maintain excessive levels of
capital under this formula. Id.
Bank capital is only one of the several necessary
factors to consider to keep the soundness of the banking
institution. Gordon, supra note 160 at 495.
5:
procedures, and the bank's competitive position were some
of the elements that the OCC used in evaluating a bank'
s
financial position. 183 In the late 1970' s, the OCC, FDIC
and FRS used "peer group comparisons of various ratios" to
determine capital adequacy. 184 The ratios regulators used
were: equity capital/total assets, total capital/total
assets, loans/total capital, fixed assets/total capital,
classified assets/total capital, and asset growth
rate/capital growth rate. 185
This comparison of various ratios become part of the
CAMEL scheme of regulation. CAMEL is the acronym for the
five elements emphasized under the Uniform Interagency Bank
Rating System formalized in 1979: (C) capital adequacy, 18 ^
183 Id.
184 Id. at 496.
185 Id.
The capital adequacy is "rated in relation to the volume
of risk assets; the volume of marginal and inferior quality
assets; bank growth experience, plans and prospects; and
the strength of management. Consideration should also be
given to a bank's capital ratios relative to its peer
group, its earnings retention and its access to capital
markets or other appropriate sources of financial
assistance." See Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 563.
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(A) assets quality, 187 (M) management ability, 188 (E)
earnings performance, 18 " (L) liquidity. 190 The Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)
developed an uniform rating system. Each bank regulator
uses the same general framework. On a scale of one to
five, banks are rated in relation to each of CAMEL
elements. The first level is the highest and applies to
The asset quality is "rated in relation to the level,
distribution and severity of classified assets; the level
and distribution of nonaccrual and reduced rate assets; the
adequacy of valuation reserves; and management's
demonstrated ability to administer and collect problem
credits. Adequate valuation reserves and a proven
capacity to police and collect problem loans clearly
mitigate to some degree the weaknesses inherent in a given
level of classified assets. Asset quality evaluation
should also take into consideration any undue degree of
concentration of credits or investment, the nature and
volume of special mention classifications, and the adequacy
of lending policies and credit administration procedures."
Id.
188 Management is rated "in relation to technical
competence; leadership and administrative ability;
compliance with banking regulation and statutes; ability to
plan and respond to changing circumstances; adequacy of and
compliance with internal policies; and depth and
succession." Id.
Earnings are rated "with respect to the ability to cover
losses and provide for adequate capital; earnings trends;
peer group comparison; the quality and composition of net
income; and the degree of reliance on interest-sensitive
funds." Id.
Liquidity is rated "in relation to the volatility of
deposits; the frequency and level of borrowings; technical
competence relative to structure of liabilities;
availability of assets readily convertible into cash; and
access to money markets or other ready sources of funds
.
Id.
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banks that show soundness in almost every aspect of its
structure. The second rating involves soundness that may
have to make a few corrections in weak areas. The
remaining three levels reflect what is consider to be a
problem bank. 1 * 1 Category three represents a moderate to
unsatisfactory weakness and "only normally resistant to
adverse business conditions." 192 The level four shows
asset weakness and an unsatisfactory combination of
elements that are consider two steps before failure. The
lowest rating of five reflects an almost imminent failure
with an urgent necessity of supervision. 193
In the early 1980' s, low capital levels were
considered an unsafe and unsound practice under the OCC
regulation. In 1983, the Fifth Circuit decision, First
National bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency194
held that a low level of bank capital was not necessarily
an unsafe and unsound practice; and the OCC did not have
191 Lovett, supra note 1 at 141-142.
192 Id.
193 Id.
94 First National Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the
Currency, 607 F.2d 674 (5 th Cir. 1985). This case law
undermined the OCC regulatory authority over capital
directives
.
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authority to determine the capital level. 1 The
response of Congress to this Court decision was the
enactment of the International Lending Supervision Act of
1983, which concluded that the maintenance of low capital
levels was an unsafe and unsound banking practice as well
as overturned the Bellaire
decision. 196 In the early 1980' s the Federal Reserve
Board, FDIC and OCC, promulgated capital standards for
domestic banks based on a bank's ratios of primary and
total capital to assets. 197
Capital standards became a very important regulatory
objective for the banking business. The Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Insurance
Corporation and the Federal Reserve System agreed, in 1985,
on equivalent capital guidelines for banks' with an uniform
capital composition's definition and minimum capital levels
as well as revised enforcement procedures. 198
195 Id.
196 Alford, supra note 169 at 195.
197 Skigen, supra note 1 at 298.
The OCC, FDIC and FRS realized that it was necessary to
keep an uniform capital standards considering the
International Lending Supervision Act importance of capital
regulation. See Gordon, supra note 160 at 500.
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In the late 1980' s a number of banks began to fail. 19S
In 1987, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England agreed
on the implementation of a common risk-based capital
standard for banks in their respective countries." Later
in the same year, regulators from twelve major banking
nations 201 agreed jointly to strengthen capital requirements
to 7.25 percent of total "risk assets" by 1990, and to 8
percent by 1992. 202
By the time that the Basle Accord was been created,
the banking situation in Panama was critical. Panama was
living through a banking crisis that affected Panama's
economy and its reputation as an International Financial
Center
.
In 1989, after the new risk based capital requirements
were promulgated in U.S., the OCC, FDIC and FRS adopted
identical risk-based capital standards based on the Basle
"During 1981-1992 bank failures became more frequent,
including Continental-Illinois, that technically was not
allowed to fail because it was the 7 th largest United States
commercial bank in 1983-84 with $42 billion in assets."
See Lovett, supra note 1 at 138.
"The Accord was intended as a basis for consultation
between the two countries, with the goal of promoting of
capital adequacy requirements among money center banks."
Gordon, supra note 160 at 503.
United States, Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, Germany,
Switzerland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg and Sweden are the twelve regulatory major
banking nations.
Lovett, supra note 1 at 130.
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Committee framework/ The Accord was extended in 1989 to
several non-GlO European Union countries when they adopted
their Own Funds Directive based on the Basle Accord
framework. 204 The Basle Accord Standards continued to be
adopted on a country by country basis after 1992."°'
The Panamanian legislation follow the paid-in-
capital/deposits as a formula for capital standards. The
formula adopted assumes that each bank must have a paid-in-
capital and a capital reserve in proportion with bank
assets. Law 101 of 1941 required paid-in capital of only
one quarter of a million Balboas (B/ . 250 , 000 . 00 ) but in
1970, with Cabinet Decree No. 238, the paid-in capital and
reserves capital requirements changed." 1 Article 30 of
the Decree established that every bank in banking business
in Panama 20 must have a paid-in capital of an assigned
capital that may be not less than one million Balboas
203 Id.
Hal S. Scott, VII International Conference of the
International Academy of Commercial and Consumer Law, The
Competitive implications of the Basle Capital Accord, 39
St. Louis U.L.J. 885 ( 1995 ) [hereinafter H.Scott]. The non-
G10 European Union countries that were also covered by the
Accord were Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
Id.
In August 1994, Brazil's Central Bank adopted the Basle
Accord. See Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 274.
Law 101 of 1941, Republic of Panama. See Cabinet
Decree No. 238 of 1970, see also Hipolito Jose Maria
Porras, Banking Law, 33 (1981) [hereinafter Porras]
.
2 07 Only banks with general license can be engage in banking
business both within or outside of Panama. Cabinet Decree
238 of 1970, article 30.
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B/. 1, 000, 000.00)
.
208 The paid-in-assigned capital must
consist of assets free from encumbrances, kept at all times
within the Republic of Panama/
Banks with an international license^ 1 ' must maintain at
all times in Panama, in assets free from encumbrances, a
sum of not less than one half of a million Balboas (B/.
500,000.00) in order to guarantee that its obligations will
be fully met. 211 However, national banks may start
operations with a paid-in capital of only one quarter of a
million Balboas (B/ . 250, 000 . 00 )
.
212 That capital must be
increased periodically up to the minimum capital standard
of one million Balboas (B/ . 1 , 000, 000 . 00) within a maximum
period of ten years. 213 With regard to the capital reserve,
the Panamanian legislation held that every bank engaging in
The Balboa, at par with the U.S. dollar is the official
monetary unit in Panama. While coins are minted in all
denominations, Panama has no paper currency of its own and
the U.S. dollar circulates freely.
209 Id.
International license is offered for banks "organized
according to Panamanian laws and engaged exclusively in
banking business, from an office established in Panama,
which are completed, accomplished or are intended to take
effect outside of Panama." Id. at art. 16.
211 Id.
National banks are every bank organized according to
Panamanian laws, a seventy-five percent (75%) at least, of
its shares is owned by natural persons who are citizens of
Panama or foreigners with more than five years of
continuous residence in Panama. Id. at art. 17.
213 Id. at article 30, paragraph 2.
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the banking business in Panama 2 ' 4 must maintain a capital
reserve, so that its paid-in-capital, as the case may be,
plus its capital reserve, is at no time less than five
percent (5%) of its productive assets. 215
In order to promote and favor the participation of
national capital in Panama's International Financial
Center, the capital adequacy criteria set forth by Panama
legislation with regard to Panamanian banks is applied in a
flexible manner. 216 Panama uses a mechanism similar to
CAMEL as the basic criteria assessing the minimum
requirements for granting banking licenses as well as
supervision. It looks at the financial situation of the
^ 14 The only banks that are engage in the banking business
in the Republic of Panama are the banks with general
license. General license "shall be issued to banks
organized under Panamanian laws and to authorized branches
of banks organized under foreign laws to engage in banking
business both within or outside of Panama." Id. at article
16.
215 Agreement No. 1-82 dated July 14,1982.
? 1 6 Participation of Panamanian banks in the development of
Panama as an International Center as well as the
distribution of its benefits, is desirable for national
growth and development. Agreement No. 17-89 dated October
31 st , 1991.
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bank,^' the composition of bank capital, the administrative
structure and policy used by each bank and its management
qualities
.
The 1997 Bill for the Banking System Modernization
refers to the United States CAMEL mechanism as one of the
systems that world class banking jurisdictions use to
supervise banking qualification." 18 This suggests that the
supervisory standards that CAMEL system offers should be
used as a model for Panama banking regulatory and
supervisory policies.
b. The Basle Accord.
One of the most significant efforts at world wide
cooperation in supervising international banks was the
creation of the Basle Committee in 1974 under the auspices
of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) . The most
notable formal result of this Committee's work is the Basle
Accord. 219
The concern over bank capital adequacy, mainly for
banks operating at the international level, prompted a
In a specific month of the year all banks have to show
in a local newspaper its last year balance sheet.
218 Panama Banking Association, Bill to Modernize the
Banking System, art. 39, numeral 3 (1997) [hereinafter The
Bill] .
Cecelia Calaby, Note, The Basle Accord: An opportunity
for expanding bank holding company securities activities?
,
23 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l & Econ. 531, 555-56 (1989)
[hereinafter Calaby]
.
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global push for protective measures""" that culminated with
the signing of the Basle Accord in July of 1988. The
objectives of the Basle Accord are: (1) to increase the
safety and soundness of international banks;" 1 and (2) to
make the competitive playing field more even for
international banks. "^ The Basle Accord sets out capital
guidelines focusing on the regulation of credit risk and,
secondarily, country transfer risk."' The guidelines
comprise four principal components: a bank capital
definition, an assets and off-balance sheet items system to
estimate the risk category, a basic schedule for the
achievement of a minimum risk based capital standard, and a
phase-in period for the transition to this standards. '
The common international definition of bank capital is
that bank capital is divided in two tiers:- tier 1 capital
"Capital adequacy alone is nor sufficient to avoid bank
failure but is a good start point for international
supervisory cooperation." Id. at 558.
"Countries are concerned with the failure of foreign
banks. Host countries are concerned that local depositors
in branches of foreign banks could lose money, even if the
host countries do not insure the deposits. Also, the
failure of a large foreign bank with placements from, or
settlement obligations to, other large banks could cause an
international chain reaction of bank failures. Capital
adequacy requirements are intended to reduce the
possibilities of such failures." H. Scott, supra note 204
at 886.
The elimination of the competitive advantage from higher
leverage ratios make the competitive playing field more
even for international banks. Id.
223 Alford, supra note 169 at 196.
224 See Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 265.
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or core capital that is "basically tangible equity""' and
tier 2 or supplementary capital that includes some hybrid
debt-equity instruments and certain reserves."" Each tier
contains specific banking instruments." In the framework
for assigning assets and off-balance sheet items a risk
category all bank assets are assigned to a risk-weight
225 H. Scott, supra note 204 at 885.
I
26 Id.
"The guidelines comprise as one of its basic elements a
common international definition of bank capital dividing it
into two components: tier 1 capital or core capital and
tier 2 capital or supplementary capital. Tier 1, which
must represent at least fifty percent of total capital,
consists of common stockholders equity, qualifying
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, and minority
interest in equity accounts of consolidated subsidiaries.
Tier 2, consist of perpetual preferred stock, hybrid
(debt/equity) capital securities, allowance for loan losses
and subordinated debt and intermediate preferred stock.
Goodwill, that represents the excess of the consideration
paid for an entity over its fair market value, is deducted
from core capital. Certain unconsolidated investments in
banking and finance and reciprocal holdings of capital
instruments are deducted from total capital." See Int'l
Finance at 265, see also Gordon, supra note 160 at 504.
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category to calculate the level of risk involved in a
specific activity. 228 The basic theory about risk weight
228 The risk weight percentage categories are as follow:
Cero percent (0%) category that includes cash, guaranteed
obligations of central banks and governments, and
securities. See Lovett, supra note 1 at 128. This category
does not requires any capital to be maintained. It is
presumed that these assets have no risk. Gordon at 505.
Ten percent (10%) category may be used for claims or
domestic public sector entities. "This category may be
used under national authorities discretion." See Alford,
supra note 169 at 199. Twenty percent (20%) risk assets
category contains cash items in the process of collection,
claims or public sector entities in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries
,
claims or multilateral development banks, short-term claims
guaranteed by non-OECD banks and claims on OECD banks or
guaranteed by OECD banks regardless of maturity. See
Alford, supra note 169 at 199, see also Gordon, supra note
160 at 505. The fifty percent (50%) risk classification
contains residential mortgage loans and certain privately-
issued mortgage- backed securities representing indirect
ownership of such loans. See Gordon, supra note 160 at 505.
The hundred percent (100%) group includes all other claims
or private obligators, claims on, or guaranteed by, non-
OECD foreign banks with a remaining maturity exceeding one
year, claims or commercial firms owned by a government and
all other assets, including any intangible assets that are
not deducted from capital. The members of the OECD are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungry, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,
new Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, turkey, United kingdom and United States. See
Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 271.
-::
assets is that "less risky essers require less capital is
protect agair.s: Isss than as riskier ssssss."""'
F s r the treatnient sf 3ff—ba1an se s is. e e "s issr.s , "" the
risk-based system applies s s ; r."ers i ::. fssssr which
indicates an asses figure . This figv re is assigr.es: is ;r.e
of the risk-weight assess perser.sage sasegsr . The Eas_-
Accors sruidelines establish ssr.vers isr. factor seseereries
"The risk-based system requires a certain percentage of
capital to be set aside depending of the level sf ri
involved in the particular activity. The more risky the
activity, the higher the risk weight, and thus, the more
capital the institution must maintain." Gordon, supra note
160 at 504-505.
Off-balance sheet items are obligations of banks sr.es
may or may not be called, such as bank guarantees. Int'l
Finance, supra note 33 at 273.
Alford, supra note 169 at 199. "Weights assigned to
off-balance sheet items are determianted through a
conversion formula that translates off-balance sheet
exposures into a rough on-balance sheet equivalent." See
Joint News release from CCC , FDIC, and FR3 re proposed
risk-based capital framework for banks, and bank holdir.j
companies, Capital Adequacy for banks and thrifts, 414
PLI/Comm 7, 10 (1987) [hereinafter Joint News].
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for the risk associated with these non-traditional
232services
.
A schedule was established for achieving, by no later
that the end of 1990, a minimum ratio of total capital-to-
risk-weighted assets of 7.25%, and by no later than the end
of 1992, a ratio of 8%. A phase-in period permits banking
institutions to include some tier 2 elements in core
capital on a temporary basis and to provide time to bring
their capital position into full conformity with the
capital adequacy standards . " J "
In sum, the capital adequacy ratio of a bank is
calculated by adding the tier 1 and tier 2 capital amounts
minus the appropriate deductions, and dividing it by the
c32 Within the 100% conversion category are included any
direct credit substitutes, risk participation in bankers
acceptances or direct credit substitutes, sale and
repurchase agreements and assets sold with recourse that
are not included on the balance sheet, forward agreements
to purchase assets or which draw down in certain, and
securities lent for which the bank is at risk. See Int'l
Finance, supra note 83 at 273. Included within the 50%
conversion factor category are transaction-related
contigencies , note issuance facilities and unused
commitments with and original maturity exceeding one year,
as well as, revolving underwriting facilities. See Gordon,
supra note 160 at 507. the 20% conversion factor includes
short-term, self -liquidating, trade-related contingencies,
including commercial letters of credit. Id. The 0%
conversion factor includes commitments that have a maturity
of less than one year or that can be unconditionally
canceled at any time. See Alford, supra note 169 at 200.
Int'l Finance, supra note 83 at 265-66.
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sum of risk-adjusted assets." The Basle Accord capital
standards are not enforceable as a treaty. Instead, each
signatory country has committed to follow the guidelines in
good faith. 23: The Basle Committee is working continuously
on the capital adequacy framework." The Basle Committee
is also trying to monitor international implementation and
to take account of the effects of accounting standards and
fiscal policy on this implementation.'"
Panama legislators view the integration of Basle
Accord standards into Panama banking law as possible and
compatible with Panama's quest for market advantages and
competitiveness." such adoption would result in better
reputation, access to better rates and international
conditions. Also it will improve Panama's economic image
with regard to other international regulatory entities.
In the bill for the modernization of the banking system,
legislators believe that an 8% capital ratio is adequate
234 See Calaby, supra note 219 at 561.
MINIMUM = Tier 1 + Tier 2
risk-adjusted assets + off-balance sheet items
Although the Accord is not mandatory world wide,
countries that not adopt the Accord, in a short future, are
going to be out of the game. Id. at 201.
These framework only or primarily focus on credit risk.
Banks are exposed to a range of other forms of risk such as
rate risk, foreign exchange risk, position risk, and
settlement and operational risks. Int'l Finance, supra
note 83 at 261.
237 Id.
238 The Bill, supra note 218 at art. 39
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for Panama but that a higher percentage is not favorable
for banking market in Panama/ 3 ' The implementation of the
3asle Accord capital standards in Panama would also
enhance Panama's international market position and
contribute to the improvement and expansion of the banking
and financial services offered by Panama's International
Financial Center. 240
All Basle Accord signatory banking institutions will
be subject to a specific and defined capital standard whose
main objective is to solidify confidence in the
international banking system." 41 Although banks not
subject to the Basle Accord guidelines, such as U.S.
domestic banks, have a competitive advantage over banks
subject to the capital guidelines," in the future banks
not subject to the standards are going to-be excluded from
the international banking business.
2 . Deposit Insurance
The prevention of another Great Depression, run on
banks which placed heavy costs on society, is the
fundamental goal of the U.S. banking system. 243 One of the
major concerns for the international banking community is
239 Id.
240 Agreement 4-81 .
241 Calaby, supra note 219 at 570
242 Alford, supra note 169 at 207
243 Lovett, supra note 1 at 131.
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the panic likely to result from failures in the
international arena. Obviously an individual can withdraw
funds from a bank at any time but if a numerous depositors
withdraw simultaneously, the bank is not going to have
sufficient funds to cover the demand. This could result
in the failure of a normally solvent bank. z44
In the U.S., the most important system for curtailing
banks runs and failures is the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation which sets "the pattern on insurance and risk
pooling for other institutions."^ 45 The Congressional
purpose underlying the creation of the FDIC was the
elaboration of a structure for "stabilizing or promoting
soundness of banking and to aid government in discharge of
its fiscal transactions."" 46
The most important function of the FDIC is to provide
federal deposit insurance to all national banks and
virtually all state chartered commercial banks, small
numbers of thrift institutions and virtually all the
nation's savings and loans banks. 247 The FDIC is in charge
of the inspection of the institution and the management of
44 Rosenfield and Stillman, supra note 14 at 307-08.
245 Id. at 132. "The FDIC is an instrumentality of the U.S.
with certain governmental privileges and with public moneys
constituting a part of its capital funds. See 1 Bank and
Banking, § 26 4, 155 (1986)
.
246
1 Bank and Banking, § 26 4,156 (1996).
247 Macey and Miller, supra note 2 at 67.
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failed banks. 248 Another important power of the FDIC is
the right to terminate the insured status of a bank that
the corporation insured. ^' In addition, the FDIC has the
power to remove or to suspend any officer or director of an
insured bank. 251
The purpose of bank examination by the FDIC is to
prevent losses which would result in claims against the
insurance fund. 251 The safety and risk control elements
that the FDIC considers in granting insurance are the same
factors or elements that the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency uses in considering whether to grant a new
national bank charter/' FDIC examination must determine
if a bank's "assets in excess of capital requirements are
adequate to enable it to meet all of its liabilities to
depositors and other creditors as shown by the books of the
248 Id. at 68. The chief function of the FDIC is to insure
deposits of all banks entitled to insurance under the law,
to the extent provided for each depositor and the second
function of the corporation is to act as receiver for
insured banks which fail. See Bank and Banking, § 26 ^ at
156 (1996)
.
"The FDIC is empowered o initiate ^cease and desist
proceedings' against the banks it insures or regulates."
Id. When the bank difficulties are caused by a single
individual and can not be controlled by the other officers
and directors, FDIC has the power to remove or to suspend
that "problem" individual. Portis, supra note 133 at 259.
"Although a bank examination by the FDIC may reveal
irregularities or fraud, such examinations, though they may
inure incidentally to the protection of the insurance
fund." First State Bank v. U.S., 599 F.2d 558 (3d
Cir.1979); see also Banks and Banking, § 26 H at 159.
252 See Chapter 3, section D(l)(a).
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bank." 25 Depositors in most U.S. banks are insured up to
$100,000.00 per account by the FDIC. 254
The need to monitor the financial condition of banks
is a strong interest of the federal government, but the
current insurance scheme is not risk-based. The same
insurance premium is charged to banks which engage in risky
activities and banks which engage in more conservative
activities. 2 The sharing of losses by the bank and its
shareholders is appropriate when failure is a result of
bank managerial mistakes or other controllable factors, but
when the failure is caused by ^systematic problems' beyond
253 12 U.S.C.A. § 1215 (a); see also Macey and Miller, supra
note 2 at 107
.
54 The original coverage was $2,500.00 per account but
today accounts of $100,000.00 are insured. Gordon at 513.
"Deposit insurance protects the same depositor only up to a
single limit. If the same depositor has four accounts of
$50,000.00 each in his or her own name, then the insurance
limit is only $ 100,000.00. But if these accounts are for
different legal interests, one for himself and three
separate trust accounts for different people or
organization, then the 100,000.00 limit applies to each
account. See Lovett, supra note 1 at 136-37.
"The risk-based capital system alone will not make up
for the deficiencies of the present insurance scheme, but
by requiring progressively more capital for more volatile
assets, the system helps to protect the insurance fund."
Gordon, supra note 160 at 514.
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control of the bank, the federal government should be
responsible for the loss." 56
As mentioned above, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation minimizes the possibility of banking runs and
failure by providing de facto insurance to creditors whose
claims are normally uninsured."' Some of the alternatives
that the FDIC has when dealing with a failed bank or a bank
in danger of failing are the pay-off of insured depositors,
the provision of direct financial assistance to the bank,
or the arrangement of a purchase-and-assumption
transaction
.
258
B . Regulation of Foreign Banks .
Capital market globalization daily challenges bank
regulators." In recent years, foreign banks have
"The protection of the insurance fund and the financial
condition of banks is possible if bank institutions
seriously consider a risk-based capital and insurance
policy requiring to those banks that undertake riskier
ventures a more prudent action by increasing required
capital and insurance costs." Id.
Rosenfield and Stillman, supra note 14 at 313.
The most common alternative chosen by the FDIC is the
purchase-and-assumption transaction in which the "assets
and liabilities of the problem bank are transferred to an
acquiring bank." Id.
Duncan Alford, Basle Committee minimum standards
:
international regulatory response to the failure of BCCI,
26 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 241, 242 (1992)
[hereinafter D. Alford].
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significantly expanded their market share in the U.S. 260
Each year, the bank business becomes more international but
some nations still have a low level of regulation in
comparison with international banking markets." 01 The
regulation of foreign bank in the different nations is a
complex scheme. The regulation of foreign banks entry into
a country' s banking system differs from country to country,
and depends upon the policies and objectives that each
country has toward both its banking industry and its
economy. ' A less developed country, like Panama, may
restrict or strongly regulate foreign banks entry to
protect its banks from competition that could threaten
their survival.'' 1 In contrast, a highly industrialized
country, like the United Sates, with a strong banking
industry, may be more concern with regulation of foreign
banks equaling that of domestic banks to assure the safety
and soundness of its banking system.
260 „ In 191Qf 12 2 foreign banks had $90 billion in assets in
the United States. By 1991, 294 foreign banks, with over
700 offices, had assets of $800 billion-nearly 25% of the
total amount of bank lending in the United States." Id. at
243.
261 Id.
262 Scoler, supra note 3 at 44.
263 Id.
264 Id.
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The entry of a foreign bank into the U.S. banking
market is possible through diverse methods." The typical
methods are the establishment of representative offices, 200
agencies," branches" 01 or bank subsidiaries/' Two
additional methods of entry into such a competitive market
are commercial lending companies and Edge Act Corporation
or Agreement Corporations." 7
2o5 Deborah Burand, Regulation of foreign banks' entry into
the United States under the FBSEA: implementation and
implications, 24 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 1089, 1090-91
(1993) [hereinafter Burand]
.
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"Representative office means any office of a foreign
bank which is located in any state and does not fall within
the definitions of branch, agency or subsidiary." See
Scoler, supra note 265 at 45.
'
"Agency means any office or any place of business of a
foreign bank located in any state of the U.S. or the
District of Columbia at which credit balances are
maintained, checks are paid, or money is lent, but at which
deposits may not be accepted from a citizen or resident of
the U.S." Bank and Banking, Regulation of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 404-05
(1992) [hereinafter R.B.G]
.
"Domestic branch means any office or any place of
business of a foreign bank located in any state of the U.S.
on the District of Columbia that may accept domestic
deposits and deposits that are incidental to or for the
purpose of carrying out transactions in foreign countries."
Id. "Branch of a foreign bank means an office or place of
business in the United States where deposits are received."
Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
"Subsidiary means an organization more than 50% of the
voting shares of which is held directly or indirectly, or
which is otherwise controlled or capable of being
controlled, by the investor or an affiliate of the investor
under any authority." R.B.G. , supra note 267 at 405.
Burand, supra note 265 at 1091. "Edges, which are
federally chartered, and Agreement Corporation, which are
state chartered, may conduct only international banking and
financial activities. Id. at 1124.
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1. The Basle Committee.
The Basle Committee is trying to create an effective,
common approach to international banking regulation but in
reality there is no international banking law. 271 The
Basle Committee efforts to keep a balance between the
systematic risk resulting from increased globalization in
the banking industry and the af fordability of the
regulation of such risk by individual nations 4 ' is
reflected in the issuance of minimum standards for bank
supervision. 2 The Basle Committee and the creation of
its first agreement on bank supervision were the result of
the collapse of the Herstatt Bank in Germany in 1974. ^ 4
The Committee has issued several guidelines for
international banking supervision having as their purpose
the "regular cooperation between its member
:71 Scoler, supra note 3 at 44.
272
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 246.
273 Id.
"Due to its fraudulent bookkeeping practice, the
Herstatt bank failed and other German banks were unable to
bail it out. Legal claims against the Herstatt bank were
eventually settled. Most of the international operations
of the bank were conducted at its head office in Germany
and, therefore, mainly domestic assets were involved.
Nevertheless, the resolution of the bank's failure...set a
negative precedent for the settlement of international
financial crises and demonstrated the need for greater
international regulation." Id.
73
countries on banking supervisory matters ."^ ' The Basle
Committee developed guidelines for the division of
responsibilities among national banking supervisory
authorities. 276 These guidelines, published in the Basle
Concordat, embodied the following principles:
(l)No foreign banking establishment should
escape supervision;
(2) the supervision of foreign banking
establishments is the joint responsibility of
host and parent authority;
(3) liquidity supervision is the responsibility of
the host authority;
( 4 ) solvency supervision is the responsibility of
the parent authority;
cooperation of supervision should be
facilitated by the exchange of information
between parent and host authorities, and indirect
examination of foreign branches by the parent
authority through the agency of host
4_u 277authorities
.
The principles of the Concordat were tested by
the financial failure in 1982 of the Luxembourg
The following guidelines had been issued by the
Committee for international banking supervision: The Basle
Concordat of 1975, the Revised Concordat of 1983 and the
Basle Accord (Capital Adequacy Standards) . Id. at 247.
These guidelines were published as the "Basle
Concordat". Calaby, supra note 219 at 556. "The Concordat
deals primarily with the liquidity, solvency, and foreign
exchange operations of foreign banks. Under the Concordat
the host supervisory authority was responsible for
regulating liquidity, regardless of the type of banking
entity established in the host nation. The supervisory
responsibility for solvency was allocated between host and
home regulators depending on the type of foreign banking
establishment involved; subsidiaries and joint ventures
were the responsibility of the host regulator, while
branches were the responsibility of the home regulator." D.
Alford, supra note 259 at 249.
277 Calaby, supra note 219 at 556-57.
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subsidiary of the Banco Ambrosiano.' The response to
this collapse was the issuiance of a reformulation of
the Concordat. 2 The purpose of this Revised
Concordat was to eliminate gaps the Concordat's
guidelines and to address "directly the adequacy of
supervision of foreign financial institutions."
The Revised Concordat introduced the x dual key'
approach and adopted the principle of consolidated
supervision. The 'dual key' supervision envisions
cooperation between the home and host supervisory
authorities in assessing the quality of each other'
s
supervision of an international bank. 281 The
international bank supervisors developed the principle
"The Banco Ambrosiano subsidiary in Luxembourg had made
$1.4 billion worth of imprudent loans to Latin American
companies. As a result, the subsidiary owed nearly $450
million to its creditors. Unable to pay its creditors, the
bank and its Luxembourg subsidiary collapsed in July 1982."
See D. Alford, supra note 259 at 251; see also Ulrich
Hess, The Banco Ambrosiano collapse and the luxury of
National Lenders of Last Resort with international
responsibilities, 22 N. Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL, 181, 185-86
(1990) [hereinafter Hess]
The reformulation of the Concordat in May 1983 is well
known as the Revised Concordat.
280
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 252.
281 With the use of the dual key supervision the Committee
intent to avoid the tendency for jurisdictions to relax
controls in order to attract more foreign investment. Id.
at 252-53.
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of consolidated supervision" 6 in which "the parent
regulator monitors the parent bank' s risk exposure and
capital adequacy based on all the operations of the
bank, wherever conducted."' 5 The Consolidated
supervision operates on a national level requiring
coordination of regulatory and supervisory standards
and frequent communication between the host and home
country regulators. 284
As mentioned above, the Basle Accord of 1988 was the
product of several years of negotiation among bank
regulators. The Basle Committee issued risk-capital
standards for banking institutions with the intention of
improving safety and soundness in the banking systems and
to create competitive equality among international banks." 1
2 . The International Banking Act of 1978 .
Foreign banks first established operations in the U.S.
in the 1800' s. Their presence became a focus of United
States regulators in the late 1960's and early 1970's. 286
In 1966, the Joint Economic Committee undertook the first
federal investigation of foreign bank activities in the
Joseph Norton, Trends in international bank supervision
and the Basle Committee on bank supervision, 48 Consumer
Fin. L.Q. Rep. 415, 416 (1994) [hereinafter J.Norton].
283
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 255.
284 J. Norton, supra note 282 at 416.
285 Alford, supra note 259 at 196.
286 Burar.
, supra note 265 at 1089.
U.S. and concluded that it was possible for a foreign bank
to gain a competitive advantage over federally regulated
domestic banks. 287 In essence, United States ' s dual banking
system allowed foreign banks to gain a competitive edge
over their domestic counterparts. 288
The first substantial step towards regulating the
presence of foreign banks in U.S. was the enactment of the
International Banking Act of 1978. 289 Federal regulation of
foreign bank activities and formalization of a policy of
national treatment 290 more than reciprocity^ 91 were the
principal objectives of the IBA." 9 Under the IBA, the
three federal bank regulatory agencies were able to
supervise and regulate foreign banks operating in the
By that time, foreign banks were regulated and
supervised by state regulatory authorities. L. Tood
Gibson, Note, The Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act
of 1991: short run consequences en route to the long term
goal, 27 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 119 at 120-21
(1995) [hereinafter Gibson]
"By opting for state regulations the foreign banks
escaped federal restrictions." Scoler, supra note 3 at 44.
The foreign banks escaped federal regulation by not
establishing subsidiaries because it could establish
branches agencies under state laws. Id.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 122.
"National treatment allows entry of foreign banks on
regulatory basis comparable to that applied domestic banks
in the United States." Scoler, supra note 3 at 44; see Orr,
Reciprocity and regulation of entry, 111. L. Rev. 333-34
(1988) [hereinafter Orr]
.
"Reciprocity allows entry on a regulatory basis
comparable to that applied to U.S. banks in the foreign
bank's home country." Scoler, supra note 3 at 44.
292 Gibson, supra note 287 at 122.
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U.S.^ 9 ' The IBA offered foreign banks the options to
obtain a federal charter, to establish federal branches and
agencies and to subsequently submit to the immediate
supervision of the OCC . 4 The IBA brought foreign banks
under the jurisdiction of the McFadden Act and the Bank
Holding Company Act which prohibit banks from branching
:9_j Burand, supra note 265 at 1093
294 Id. "The IBA seeks to eliminate the regulatory
advantages favoring foreign banking institutions at the
expense of domestic banks. IBA introduce several major
changes in federal banking policy:
1. An option for federal licensing of foreign branches and
agencies as well as for subsidiaries.
2. Mandatory deposit insurance for foreign branches engaged
in retail banking.
3. Imposition of reserve requirements on foreign branches
and agencies.
4
.
Limitation on the further expansion of multistate
deposit taking activities.
5. Extension of the nonbanking prohibition of the BHC Act
to foreign banks operating branches, agencies, and
commercial lending companies.
6. Appointment of the Federal Reserve to act as the
residual examining agency in order to insure federal
regulation of existing multistates activities of foreign
banks
.
7 Removal of restrictions preventing foreign banks from
establishing Edge Corporations or acquiring a majority
interest therein. Similarly, the IBA eliminates the
requirement that all directors of Edge Corporations be
American citizens."
See Nicholas Deak and JoAnne Celusak, International
Banking, New Yor Institute of Finance, 198 (1984).
[hereinafter Deak]
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throughout the country." The Federal Reserve System did
not have licensing authority regarding the establishment of
foreign banks branches and agencies in U.S.^ 9(l but it was
authorized to examine foreign banks' branches and agencies,
or "any U.S. commercial lending company or bank controlled
by a foreign bank." 297 Under the IBA, United States
branches of foreign banks are required to apply for federal
deposit insurance for their retail deposits." 98
3. The BCCI scandal in United States.
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI")
affair, the biggest financial scandal and fraud in banking
history, highlighted the supervisory deficiencies of the
295 Burand, supra note 265 at 1093. "The IBA establishes
statutory federal jurisdiction over the U.S. operations of
foreign banks. The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System regulates both the bank reserves and the
examination of branches and agencies of foreign banks.
Additionally, previous 'domestic only' laws and
regulations, such as the Bank Holding Company Act, were
made applicable to the non-banking activities of foreign
banks. As such the Glass Steagall Act, which mandates the
separation of investment banking and commercial banking, is
applicable to foreign banks as well." See Scoler, supra
note 3 at 44-45.
296 Burand, supra note 265 at 1094.
297 Id.
"Accordingly, under the IBA, the FDIC also plays a role
in the supervision and regulation of insured branches of
foreign banks." Id. at 1095.
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international banking system.'"' The Pakistani financier
Aga Hassan Abedi 300 founded BCCI in 1972 using Abu Dhabi
investors funds. 301 BCCI was incorporated through a bank
holding company in Luxembourg. 302 BCCI Holdings
(Luxembourg) S.A. had two principal subsidiaries: The Bank
of Credit and Commerce International S.A., incorporated in
Luxembourg, and The Bank of Credit and Commerce
International (Overseas) Ltd., incorporated in Cayman
Islands. 3 ' The significant point of these organizational
arrangements was that while not conducting business there,
BCCI's holding company and its major subsidiary were
chartered in counties in whose regulator authorities were
99 Scoler, supra note 3 at 45. "BCCI was a case of
widespread institutional fraud on a global scale (involving
at least 19 jurisdictions) and brought into question the
ability of the domestic regulation of international banks
to control such transborder fraud." See J. Norton, supra
note 282 at 415.
The founder and president of BCCI, Agha Hassan Abedi was
not a man who liked banking laws or banking regulators.
See Raj K. Bhala, Foreign bank regulation after BCCI, North
Carolina, 13, 1994 [hereinafter Bhala]
101 Edwards, supra note 5 1267
302 Id. at 1268.
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 262. The BCCI Holdings were
BCCI S.A., with 46 offices in 12 countries and two agencies
in U.S.; BCCI Overseas, with 62 offices in 28 countries
(two in Panama), and Other BCCI Subsidiaries, with 26
consolodated subsidiearies . See Bhala, supra note 300 at
xvii .
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not required to monitor BCCI's global activities. 304
In 1982, after several years of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) rejection to approve the
purchase, 3 BCCI successfully gain control of Financial
General Bankshares in Washington and renamed it as First
American Bankshares
.
j3
' First American's Chairman, former
Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, assured the U.S.
government that BCCI was not involved with the First
American Bank, but in reality BCCI had actually acquired
the bank through "front" involving Middle Eastern investor
loans. 3 ' Through First American, BCCI was able to acquire
illegally the Independence Bank of Encino, California, the
National Bank of Georgia, Cen-Trust Savings Bank, and
Credit and Commerce American Holdings (CCAH) , which was the
parent company of First American Bankshares
.
3Ci
In 1988, the Federal Reserve indicted BCCI for money
laundering in the United States. This started a
coordinated investigation of BCCI. In 1991, a Price
Waterhouse report inform detailed BCCI's massive fraud. 3 '
,04 Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
"The SEC requires foreign banks to disclose details
about their operations if they plan to own more than five
percent of the outstanding shares in an American holding
company. BCCI tried to avoid these disclosures by working
with several parties to buy the stock." Id.
306 Edward, supra note 5 at 1268.
307
Id. at 1269.
308
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 260.
309 Edwards, supra note 5 at 1270.
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The importance of multinational banks in a global
economy and its supervision is demonstrated by the failure
of the BCCI. 310 The two basic lessons that emerge with this
scandal were that BCCI operated without having a home
country regulator monitoring its operations and BCCI
"recordkeeping practices were undetected because of the
lack of uniform regulatory standards." 311 With regard to
home country supervision, BCCI demonstrates that it is only
relevant when that jurisdiction has "[ 1 ] comparable
supervisory standards to that host jurisdiction
,
[2]
a
capacity to implement and enforce such standards, and [3]
a
deposit insurance and lender of last resort dimension." 3 '
The lack of uniform regulatory standards allowed BCCI "to
shift losses from its records in one country to that of
another country without raising any concerns on the part of
regulators about the bank's solvency." 313
The Basle Committee's response to the BCCI scandal was
the formulation of new minimum standards. 314 The new
minimum standards rest upon the principles that:
(1) all international banks and banking groups
should be supervised by a "home country"
regulator; (2) an international bank should
310 Id. at 1273
311 Id.
312 J. Norton, supra note 282 at 416.
313 Edwards, supra note 5 at 1277.
314
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 267. The Committee
reformulated the principles reflected in the Basle
Concordat and the Revised Concordat.
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obtain the permission of both the host: and home
regulators before opening a branch or other
banking establishment in a foreign nation; (3)
banking regulators should have the right to
gather information from international banks; (4)
if the minimum standards are not met, a host
regulator may impose restrictive measures against
the international bank; and (5) information
exchanges between regulators in different nations
should continue to be encouraged. 315
4. The Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act.
Scandals involving foreign banks operating in the
United States have prompted regulators to realize that the
growth of foreign bank activities in the United States, 316
poses significant dangers because banks may act
"deliberately and fraudulently, exploting weaknesses in the
international supervision of international banking
operations." 317 Consequently, Congress enacted the Foreign
Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 (FBSEA), 318 as part
315 Id. at 267.
316 Burand, supra note 265 at 1097. "The BCCI and the Banca
Nazionale de Lavoro incidents highlighted for Congress the
gaps in the existing regulatory regime." Gibson, supra note
287 at 126.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 143. "The BCCI engaged in
extensive money laundering and fraud. The Banca Nazionale
de Lavoro made close to $3 billion in illegal loans to
Iraq, which went to finance weapon sales in conflict with
U.S. policy." Id.
318 12 U.S.C.A. § 3101-3111 (Supp. IV 1992). See Scoler,
supra note 3 at 45.
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of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act of 1991. 319
The FBSEA was enacted in the same form as proposed by
the Federal Reserve, but it differs from the Federal
Reserve proposal in some areas. 320 Prior to the FBSEA,
individual state banking regulators supervised foreign
banks in the United States, but under the FBSEA, the
Federal Reserve must approve the entry of foreign banks
into the U.S. banking business. 321
The Foreign Banks Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991
creates four primary provisions that change the existing
regulatory regime. 3. First, all foreign banks seeking to
establish federal or state licensed branches or agencies 3 '
to operate in the United States must receive Federal
Reserve approval to enter the country. 24 Under the FBSEA,
319
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 279. "The FDICIA was
enacted with the purpose to reform the financial services
industry and the federal deposit insurance system in the
U.S. the FDICIA provided additional resources to the Bank
Insurance Fund (BIF) and strengthened supervision and
examination of federally insured institutions." Gibson,
supra note 287 at 126-27.
20 Burand, supra note 265 at 1101.
321
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 279. "The standards for
approval for representative offices, branches, agencies and
subsidiaries of foreign banks are now enumerated in the
FBSEA of 1991." Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 129.
Burand, supra note 265 at 1101.
4 The Fed intends to ensure that only adequately
capitalized and properly supervised non-U. S. banking
organizations are permitted to enter onto the U.S. market.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 129.
84
consolidated supervision standards were established"'' which
foreign banks must comply with to enter the United
States. 3 ' These standards assume that:(l) "the foreign bank
engages directly in the business of banking outside the
U.S."; 3 '' 7 (2) "the foreign bank is subject to comprehensive
supervision in its home country"; 3 ' and (3) "the foreign
bank has furnished to the Board the information it needs to
adequately assess the application." 3 ' The Fed considers
five factors to determine whether a specific applicant's
home country supervisor provides comprehensive consolidated
supervision in a particular case:
(1) ensuring that individual banks which they
oversee have adequate procedures for
monitoring and controlling domestic and
international activities;
(2 ) collecting regular reports (e.g. audits) on
the condition of the parent bank, and the
subsidiaries and office outside the home
country;
325 Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
326 Gibson, supra note 287 at 130.
Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
3
l
a Id.
Gibson, supra note 287 at 130. "In order to obtain
Federal Reserve Board approval, a foreign bank wishing to
open an establishment in the United States must show that
it is subject to ^comprehensive supervision or regulation
on a consolidated basis' by its home regulator. If it
wishes to establish a branch or agency in the U.S., the
foreign bank also must make adequate assurances that it
will provide the Federal Reserve Board whatever information
the FRB deems necessary for its supervision of the foreign
bank. The FRB thus will be concerned about other nations'
bank secrecy laws that may prevent it from obtaining
sufficient information on the parent bank." D. Alford,
supra note 259 at 279-80.
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(3) collecting information regarding the
relationship between the parent bank and its
foreign and domestic affiliates;
(4 ) collecting financial reports that are
consolidated on a worldwide basis; and
( 5 ) evaluating prudential standards (e.g. capital
adequacy) on a worldwide basis. 3
There are four additional discretionary standards
associated with entry approval into the U.S.: (1) the home
country authorities must consent to the bank' s proposed
U.S. expansion; (2) the financial and managerial resources
of the foreign bank must appear adequate; (3) the provision
of all the information required by the Fed must be
provided; and (4) the compliance by the foreign bank must
comply with all applicable United States laws. 331
The second provision enacted by the FBSEA focuses on
the termination of foreign bank offices operations. It
provides that the Fed may terminate the operations of a
state chartered foreign bank office, 3 when the Board finds
that the home country no longer meets proper standards of
comprehensive supervision. 3 The FBSEA also gives the Fed
the power to recommend to the OCC the termination of the
operations of a federally chartered foreign bank office. 334
This recommendation may be made if the foreign bank office
Gibson, supra note 287 at 131.
Scoler, supra note 3 at 45.
332 Gibson, supra note 287 at 132.
Scoler, supra note 3 at 46.
!34 Gibson, supra note 287 at 132.
36
is "not subject to comprehensive consolidated home county
supervision"' and "the bank has engaged in unsound and
unsafe banking practices." 3 '36
The third provision restricts the latitude of foreign
banks to take deposits. Acceptance of deposits of less
than $100,000.00 is allowed only for foreign banks that
have an insured U.S. subsidiary. 3 Foreign banks may not
established new insured retail branches , but "branches
existing prior to the FBSEA are grandfathered provided that
they continue to operate in compliance with section 6 of
IBA." 338 Uninsured deposits of less than $100,000.00 are
acceptable if they are wholesale deposits. 339
The four provision authorizes Federal Reserve
examination of foreign bank state licensed branches and
^„„„„; «,„ 340agencies
.
335 Id.
336
D. Alford, supra note 259 at 280.
337 Id. at 281.
338 Gibson, supra note 287 at 133. See 12 U.S.C.A. §
3104 (c) (2) (Supp. IV 1992) .
39 Gibson, supra note 287 at 133.
340 Id. The FBSEA makes changes in the regulation of
foreign banks in U.S. Federal Reserve Board is the primary
regulator of foreign banks in U.S. The dual banking system
regulation is not applicable to foreign banks. Foreign
banks must obtain a state banking license and the prior
approval of the Federal Reserve Board if want to enter in
U.S. banking business. D. Alford, supra note 259 at 280.
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In 1994, Congress enacted the Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), authorizing interstate
branching. Three type of branching are permitted:
First, a bank holding company [is] permitted to
acquire banks in another state and subsequently
convert them to branches. Second, a bank [may]
merge with an out of state bank and ~hen convert
the latter to a branch. Finally, [branching] may
be achieved by de novo establishment of direct
branches . 341
IBBEA' s section 104 authorizes foreign bank
establishment and operation of a Federal branch or Federal
agency or a State branch or state agency in any state
outside the foreign bank's home state if "(A) the
establishment and operation of branch or agency is
expressly permitted by the State in which the branch or
agency is to be established" 34 "' and "(B) in the case of a
Federal or State branch, the branch receives only such
deposits as would be permissible for corporation organized
under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act." 343
Section 107 offers equal competitive opportunities to
foreign and U.S. banking institutions if the OCC and the
341 Charles Hultman, Foreign Banks and the U.S. Regulatory
Environment, 114 The Banking Journal, 457,
(1997) [hereinafter Hultman]
.
342 Id. at 458.
343 Id.
FDIC ensure that foreign banks do not receive an unfair
competitive advantage over U.S. banks. 44
5 . The Federal Reserve Board as regulator of foreign
.
banks .
The Federal Reserve System is one of the three federal
regulators of banks in the United States. 345 The Federal
Reserve is the regulator of bank holding companies and of
state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System. 346 Under several statutory provisions
foreign banks, which want to engage in the banking business
in the U.S., are also closely supervised by the Federal
Reserve System. 347 Pursuant to these provisions, the
Federal Reserve established the following guidelines for
the examination of foreign banks organizations (FBO)
:
348
(1) An annual safety and soundness examination of the
foreign bank, unless "the condition of the branch suggests
a need for more regular assessments." 349
344 Id.
David Holland, Foreign bank capital and the United
States Federal Reserve Board, 20 Int'l Law. 785, 786
(1986) [hereinafter Holland]
.
346 Id.
347
Id.
348
"The manual provides supervisory agencies with guidance
in evaluating branches in the context of the entire Foreign
Bank Organization." See Marvin Tubbs II, International
Banking—Foreign Banks Operating in the U.S., 15 Ann. Rev.
Banking L. 161 (1996) [hereinafter Tubbs]
.
349 Id.
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(2) The examination findings must be integrated into a
'summary of condition' for each foreign bank "in
order to provide insights into the particular strengths and
weaknesses of the foreign bank in U.S. operations." 3 "
(3) In the preparation of the summary of conditions the Fed
will examine all elements of the ROCA rating system. 3
When the summary is completed the Fed may assign a
combination of ratings between I to 5 to determine the
range of the foreign bank's U.S. operations.
350 Id. at 162.
l51
Id. The ROCA system focuses on risk management,
operational controls, compliance and asset quality. The
ROCA system focused on the foreign bank history compliance
with federal and state law and on the ability of foreign
banks to manage its risk assets. Id at 164.
"A combined rating of 1 indicates the existence of a
fundamentally sound FBO requiring no extra supervisory
attention. The Fed assigns a combined rating of 2 to those
FBOs it considers basically sound yet still possess some
modest, easily correctable, deficiencies requiring no more
than normal supervision. A combined rating of 3 suggests
regulatory concern warranting greater supervision. The Fed
may also assign a rating 3 where risk management,
operational controls or compliance are by themselves viewed
as an unsatisfactory means of correcting the branch'
s
deficiencies. A combined rating of 4 indicates the
existence of serious weaknesses within the FBO which create
unsafe and unsound banking practices requiring close
supervisory attention, surveillance, and the implementation
of a corrective plan. A FBO determined to be so unsafe and
unsound that it requires immediate restructuring will
receive a rating of 5." Id. at 162.
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(4) The Fed also conducts a strength of support assessment
that "enables the Fed to better evaluate a FBO' s ability to
support its U.S. operations.'^'
Recently, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors
issued the final revisions to Regulation K, which regulates
international banking operations. 354 The revision
established that foreign banks have the authorization "tc
open offices in U.S. through prior notice procedures,
eliminating the need for qualifying banks to file a formal
application with the Fed." 3 " However, there is a
reciprocity provision which precludes foreign banks from
managing activities that could not be managed by a U.S.
bank at its foreign branches or subsidiaries. 356
There are also some U.S. policies and procedures that
a foreign bank must follow to satisfy the Federal Reserve
requirements. The factors a FBO should consider to improve
The two components of the assessment are the analysis of
the capability of a FBO to meet its U.S. obligations and
the identification of internal control risks apparent
within the bank regardless of its financial stability. Id.
at 163.
Anjali Kumar, International Banking—Foreign Banks
operating in the United Sates, 16 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 144
(1997) [hereinafter Kumar]
.
355 Id.
"The prohibition applies to offshore branches managed or
controlled by a foreign bank's U.S> branches or agencies."
Id. at 145.
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its efficiency and its relationship with U.S. regulators
are :
Adopt comprehensive, uniform policies, procedures
and management information systems that cover all
U.S. offices; [c]oordinate this effort with the
head office in the foreign bank' s home country,
where business practices and regulatory
expectations sometimes are different; [e]stablish
a regional administrative office to consolidate
administrative functions; this should help
eliminate duplication and maximize the potential
for risk identification and control; [a]ssign an
individual or a group at the administrative
office to track regulatory developments and
ensure steps are taken to comply with regulatory
requirements . 357
6 . Regulation of foreign banks in Panama .
Under the Bill for the Modernization of the Banking
System only Panamanian banks with 51% of Panamanian
capital, and subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks can
undertake banking activities in Panama. 35 '8 Consequently, if
a foreign bank wishes to establish a banking office in
Panama, is only possible through a subsidiary or branch.
Carol Beaumier, Uniform foreign bank policies and
procedures would please U.S. regulators, 12 NO . 4 Banking
Pol'y Rep. 4 (1993) [ hereinafter Beaumier].
35 8 Asociacion Panameha de Bancos, Banca & Mercadc , 3
(1997) [hereinafter B&M]
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Consequently, a foreign entity can not establish in Panama
a bank independent of a parent bank in its home country. 359
This policy is viewed as strengthening the Panama Financial
Center as well as charging home country regulators with the
supervision of its branches and subsidiaries on a
consolidated supervision basis. 3 '
359 Id. at 4
360 Id.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
1. The worldwide banking business has undergone important
changes in its structure and regulation, and is currently
in a stage of continuing development and expansion.
2. The objectives of bank regulation is to avoid
monopolies in the domestic and international arena, and to
minimize the risk of banks becoming insolvent and to
protect depositors if failures occur. 361
3. Every country regulates their banking activities in
accordance with the community necessities and its economic
requirements
.
4 . It is difficult to make every country follow a
specific international regulation but if every nation has a
common regulatory starting point, the regulatory gaps can
be eliminated.
5. The two major components of banking regulation in the
U.S. and Panama are the regulation of banks and bank
holding companies.
6. The changes suffered in the last decades by the
i61 Edwards, supra note 5 at 1277
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banking system are affecting the dual banking system. This
is reflected :.r :he evolution of state and federal
chartered banks in the 90' s.
7. Total supervisi n /stem is the main
objective of the Basle Accord. Nations need its
coordinating power to properly to supervise their banks
with operations beyond their home country.
8. Regulators of host countries ' must pay attention to
the regulation and supervision of the bank's activities in
their home countries.
9. Terms such as "capital adequacy" and "consolidated
supervision" serve as "code words" for enhanced and
broadened bank supervision on both the international and
domestic level. 3 3
10. The international banking supervision standards under
the Basle Accord have had a profound impact upon the U.S.
regulations, mainly in its risk-based capital adequacy and
capital-based supervisory schemes. 364
11. Capital adequacy is a very important element to
procure the safety and soundness of the banking system but
it is not the only one. There are other elements, eg.,
This is the specific case of Panama
363 J.Norton, supra note 282 at 415.
364 Id. at 419.
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liquidity; funding and market risks; the quality and level
of earnings; the effectiveness of loan and investment
policies; and the overall ability of management to monitor
other financial risks, 365 that should be considered to
achieve a better regulatory structure.
12. International regulators will continue to review the
capital standards and regulatory scheme in general to
fulfill the international banking community's requirements.
Panama has to embrace regulatory revisions to be at the
same level that other financial centers.
13. The regulation of foreign banks, basically the IBA,
the FBSEA and the Basle Accord implementations in U.S.,
will serve as an example for less development countries
with regard to standards used to evaluate the entry of
foreign banks within national boundaries.
14. The adoption by Panama of the Basle Accord Standards
will require changes in Panama's strategies and regulatory
policies in order to comply with the more stringent capital
requirement
.
15. Experience using these standards will tell us if it
works and what possible changes regulators should make to
improve Panama's banking and financial system.
Gordon, supra note 160 at 519.
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